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Can a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerge among strangers?  We investigate this question by examining 
behavior in an experiment where subjects repeatedly play a two-player binary ―trust‖ game.  Players are randomly 
and anonymously paired with one another in each period. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of 
trust  and  reciprocity  emerges  under  the  most  extreme  information  restriction  (anonymous  community-wide 
enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past 
history  of  play  and  whether  that  information  must  be  provided  freely  or  at  some  cost.  In  the  absence  of  such 
reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of 
reputational  information  on  past  individual  decisions  significantly  increases  trust  and  reciprocity,  with  longer 
histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small 
cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not 
choose to purchase this information. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Trust is a key element in sustaining specialization and trade. In many economic transactions, trust 
emerges among essentially anonymous agents who have little recourse to direct or immediate punishment.  
For instance, in electronic commerce, it is easy to create new identities, and buyers and sellers often 
engage in what are, essentially, one-shot transactions.  In the market for credit cards, individual card-
holders frequently display little loyalty to any particular bank or card issuer, freely switching balances 
between credit cards.  Similarly, few tourists repeatedly return to the same vacation area to consume again 
in the same hotel or restaurant. 
Given the anonymous and infrequent nature of economic transactions in these markets, an important 
question is how such markets can work efficiently.  In particular, what is the incentive for sellers in 
electronic markets to deliver the goods purchased, or of the quality promised, knowing that they are 
unlikely to meet the same buyer again?  What is the incentive for borrowers to repay credit card debts if 
they can switch to another lender next time?  What is the incentive for hotels and restaurants in vacation 
areas to provide good service, knowing that the same consumers are unlikely to ever return? 
One possibility is that such incentive problems can be solved by a legal process. However, in many 
instances, the cost of litigation would far exceed the benefit from the transaction; in such instances legal 
considerations can simply be ruled out.  On the other hand, we do observe that in all of these markets there 
exist reputation systems that collect and disseminate information about market participants.  For instance, 
in  most  electronic  markets  there  is  an  online  feedback  system  that  allows  buyers  to  rate  their  prior 
transaction experiences with sellers and this information is publicly (and typically freely) available. In the 
credit card market, third party credit bureaus collect information about the customers of all banks and 
credit card companies and provide the information to other financial institutes, typically for a small fee.  
Travel guides and websites (e.g. Tripadvisor) provide feedback from tourists about hotels and restaurants 
in vacation areas.    
In this paper we examine several mechanisms by which trust and the reciprocation of trust might be 
sustained by a finite population of strangers who must repeatedly and anonymously interact with one 
another in pairwise meetings. We first examine the hypothesis that trust is attached to the society as a 
whole;  the  fear  of  the  destruction  of  that  trust  might  suffice  to  enforce  trustworthy  behavior  by  all 
members of the society as shown by Kandori (1992).  As an alternative (but within the same economic 
environment), we examine the possibility that trustworthiness resides at the individual rather than at the 
societal level.  In particular, we ask whether the provision of information on individual reputations for 
trustworthiness engenders greater trust than in the case where such information is absent, and if so, how 
long the history of information must be. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we explore whether the 
free provision of reputational information is responsible for our findings or whether trust and reciprocity   2 
can be sustained by making individual reputational information costly to acquire, as occurs, for example, 
when an agent must purchase a credit report to learn about the past trustworthiness of another agent.   
We explore these issues both theoretically and experimentally  using versions of a repeated two-
player sequential ―trust‖ (or ―investment‖) game (due to Berg et al., 1995).  In our version of this game, 
the first mover or ―investor‖ decides whether to invest his endowment with the second mover, the ―trustee,‖ 
resulting  in  an  uncertain  payoff.    Alternatively,  the  investor  can  simply  keep  his  endowment.  If  the 
investor invests (or ―trusts‖), the endowment is multiplied by a fixed factor that is greater than 1 and it 
falls to the trustee to decide whether to keep the whole amount or to return some fraction of it to the 
investor (i.e. to ―reciprocate‖), keeping the remainder for himself. Subjects are asked to play repeated 
versions of this game where, in each period, subjects were randomly and anonymously paired with one 
another.    Using  this  random,  anonymous,  pairwise  matching  protocol,  we  examine  several  different 
treatments.  In our baseline treatment the trust game is played for an indefinite number of periods and is 
parameterized in such a way that, given the number of participants and random anonymous matching, a 
social norm
1 where all investors invest (trust) and all trustees return part of the investment (reciprocate) 
constitutes a sequential equilibrium without any information provided to investors regarding the identity 
of their current trustee or that trustee’s past history of play.  In a second treatment everything is the same 
as in the baseline treatment except that the trust game is played for a known finite rather than an indefinite 
number of periods; in that case, a social norm of full trust and reciprocity is not a sequential equilibrium.  
In a third treatment, everything is the same as in the baseline treatment except that, prior to making a 
decision, the investor can observe the trustee’s action choice in the prior period (Keep or Return).  In a 
fourth treatment, everything is the same as in the third treatment except that, prior to making a decision, 
the investor can observe a longer history of the trustee’s prior choices as well as the frequency with which 
the trustee chose to return in the current supergame.  Finally, in a fifth treatment, everything is the same as 
in the fourth treatment, except that the investor must first choose whether to pay a small cost to view the 
trustee’s history of actions for the current supergame. If the investor does not pay this information cost 
then, from the investors’ perspective, the game is similar to our first baseline treatment where the investor 
has no knowledge of the prior actions of the trustee with whom he is matched.  If the investor does pay for 
this information, then, from the investor’s perspective, the game is similar to that of our fourth treatment.  
Importantly,  in  our  fifth  treatment,  the  trustee  does  not  know  whether  the  investor  has  purchased 
information about the trustee’s past behavior. 
In the first treatment, where no individual information is available, we are able to test the theoretical 
possibility that a social norm of trust and reciprocity can be sustained by anonymous, randomly matched 
agents out of the fear that deviating from such a norm would precipitate a contagious wave of distrust and 
                                            
1 We follow Kandori (1992) and Young (2008) in defining a ―social norm‖ as rules of behavior that serve to coordinate interactions among 
individuals and specify sanctions for violators.   3 
retaliatory non-reciprocation. In this baseline treatment we find that the frequency of trust and reciprocity 
is low, averaging around one-third.  Our second treatment examines whether the indefiniteness of the 
horizon plays a role as theory suggests in sustaining trust and reciprocity. We find that with a finite 
horizon, the frequency of trust and reciprocity is about the same as with an indefinite horizon. Our third 
treatment asks whether ―minimal‖ reputational information at the individual level can improve matter 
relative to the baseline frequency, specifically whether additional information on the prior-period behavior 
of trustees (second-movers) causes these players to reciprocate (Return) more often and if so, whether this 
change in trustees’ behavior engenders greater trust on the part of investors who move first.  We find that, 
when minimal information on the trustee’s prior-period choice is provided following the absence of such a 
reputational  mechanism  (treatment  1  to  treatment  3),  this  change  does  indeed  lead  to  a  large  and 
significant increase in both trust and reciprocity. However, reversing the order, when minimal information 
about trustees is initially provided and then removed (treatment 3 to treatment 1) we find no significant 
difference in the frequency of trust and reciprocity between these two treatments.  In our fourth treatment, 
when the amount of information about trustees is increased to include the frequency with which the trustee 
has played return in all prior periods of the current supergame (i.e., there is ―full‖ information), we find 
that  such  order  effects  disappear:  the  provision  of  the  longer  history  of  information  about  the  prior 
decisions of trustees leads to significant increases in trust and reciprocity relative to the absence of such 
information, regardless of treatment order.  Finally, in our fifth treatment, where investors must decide 
whether  to  purchase  full  information  on  the  prior  decisions  of  their  matched  trustee  in  the  current 
supergame (provided freely in our fourth treatment), we find that on average, only one-fourth of investors 
choose to purchase this information so that the other three-fourths are in the dark about the prior behavior 
of their current trustee. Nevertheless, trust and reciprocity is significantly higher in this costly information 
treatment as compared with the baseline, no-information treatment.  
We conclude that high levels of trust and reciprocity require the availability of individual reputational 
information  as  provided,  for  example,  by  a  credit  bureau  and  cannot  be  sustained  by  community 
enforcement of a  social norm of good behavior.  We further conclude that  longer histories are more 
beneficial than shorter histories in the promulgation of reputational concerns.               
 
2. Related Literature 
 
We are not the first to explore the mechanisms supporting trust and reciprocity among anonymous 
strangers in repeated interactions.  We build upon several prior theoretical and experimental studies. 
 
2.1 Cooperation in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game under Random Matching 
   4 
Under anonymous random matching, Kandori (1992) shows that cooperation may be possible if all 
players adhere to a ―contagious strategy‖ in which individuals who have not experienced a defection 
choose ―Cooperation,‖ and individuals who have either experienced a defection by their opponent or have 
defected themselves in the past choose ―Defection.‖ Specifically, he shows that for an infinite horizon and 
for  any  fixed  population  size,  we  can  define  payoffs  for  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  game  that  sustain 
cooperation in a sequential equilibrium. 
As pointed out by Kandori (1992), there are two substantial problems associated with a ―contagious 
equilibrium.‖ First, when the population is large, the argument applies only to games with extreme payoff 
structures. Second, a single defection causes a permanent end to cooperation and this fragility may make 
the equilibrium inappropriate as a model for trade.  Ellison (1994) extends Kandori’s work and remedies 
these problems by introducing a public randomization device that allows for adjustment in the severity of 
the punishment. Compared to Kandori’s (1992) results, the equilibrium in Ellison (1994) does not require 
excessive patience on the part of players and applies to more general payoff structures. Furthermore, given 
public randomizations, the equilibrium strategy supports nearly efficient outcomes even when players 
make mistakes with a small probability. More recently, Dal Bo (2007) has shown how social norms can be 
sustained by schemes that only punish deviators given sufficient information on opponent’s past behavior. 
Duffy and Ochs (2009) conduct an experimental test of Kandori’s (1992) contagious equilibrium 
using groups of subjects who play an indefinitely repeated two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma under different 
matching protocols and different amounts of information transmission. Their results show that, under 
fixed pairings, a social norm of cooperation emerges as subjects gain experience, while under random 
matching,  experience  tends  to  drive  groups  toward  a  far  more  competitive  norm,  even  when  some 
information is provided about the prior choices of opponents. Thus they conclude that random matching 
works to prevent the development of a cooperative norm in the laboratory. Camera and Casari (2009) 
address the same issue of cooperation under random matching, but focus on the role of private or public 
monitoring of the anonymous (or non-anonymous) players’ choices and find that such monitoring can lead 
to a significant increase in the frequency of cooperation relative to the case of no monitoring. 
In contrast to these papers, in this study we examine the indefinitely repeated ―trust‖ game instead of 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  Unlike the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the trust (or ―investment‖) game 
(Berg et al., 1995) we study in this paper has 1) sequential moves and 2) no strictly dominant strategies. In 
particular, the first mover has an incentive to choose ―trust‖ (rather than no trust) if he believes the second 
mover will reciprocate, while the second mover has an incentive to cheat (not reciprocate) if the first 
mover trusts him, but is indifferent between cheating and reciprocating otherwise. This game is more 
closely related to many real-world one-sided incentive problems found, for example, in credit markets
 or 
in  transactions  between  buyers  and  sellers  in  cyberspace  (e-Commerce),  where  two  players  move   5 
sequentially and only the second mover always wants to deviate from reciprocation in the one-shot game.
2  
The one-sided  incentive problem  of the trust game   may be  a  more promising  environment  for the 
achievement of a social norm of cooperation (trust and reciprocity)  under anonymous random matching 
than the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with its two-sided incentive problem. Furthermore we note that most 
real-world reputation systems are designed to monitor the behavior of ―second movers‖.  For these reasons, 
we think it is important to study the trust game under anonymous random matching and with various 
levels of information on second movers. 
 
2.2 Repeated Trust Games 
 
Xie and Lee (2011) theoretically extend Kandori’s (1992) argument to the development of trust and 
reciprocity  among  anonymous,  randomly  matched  players  in  the  infinitely  repeated  trust  game  and  
provide sufficient conditions that support a social norm of trust and reciprocity as a sequential equilibrium 
in the absence of reputational information.  The trust game experiment we report on in this paper satisfies 
the  Xie  and  Lee  conditions  in  all  treatments,  so  that  in  the  absence  of  any  information  about  one’s 
randomly determined opponents, a social norm of trust and reciprocity may be sustained by the threat to 
move to a contagious wave of distrust and confiscation.  However, we also explore the notion that some 
information about opponents’ prior behavior may help to sustain social norms of trust and reciprocity, as 
such  information  makes  it  easier  for  players  to  discern  player  types  thus  enabling  reputational 
considerations. 
There are several experimental papers on repeated trust games that relate to this study.  Keser (2003) 
studies a trust game where ―buyers‖ and ―sellers‖ are randomly matched and prior to making investment 
decisions, buyers have either no information about their matched seller, or the seller’s most recent rating 
(by another buyer), or the entire distribution of the seller’s prior ratings (by other buyers). She reports that 
revelation of seller ratings significantly increases both trust and reciprocity relative to the baseline case of 
no  information  and  that  longer  histories  of  ratings are  more effective  than  shorter rating  histories in 
increasing the levels of trust and reciprocity. Similar findings are reported by Bolton et al. (2004, 2005), 
Bohnet et al. (2005), Brown and Zehnder (2007) and Charness et al. (2011) using various versions of the 
trust game and varying the amounts and kinds of past information available to buyers and sellers as well 
as, in some studies, the matching protocols (strangers or partners).  Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006ab)  
are the only prior experimental studies examining trust and reciprocity in indefinitely repeated trust games, 
but they focus on the case of fixed pairings (a partners design). 
These studies all differ from the one reported here in several important dimensions. First, since Keser 
                                            
2 Kandori (1992) has a formal definition of a ―one-sided incentive problem‖ (Definition 4 on page 73). The concept requires that, only one of two 
parties has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative outcome, and there is a Nash equilibrium such that the payoff from the equilibrium is less 
than the payoff from the cooperative outcome for the party who has the incentive problem.   6 
(2003), Bolton et al. (2004, 2005), Bohnet et al. (2005), Brown and Zehnder (2007) and Charness et al. 
(2011) investigate finitely repeated games and Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006ab) study both finite and 
indefinitely repeated games under fixed pairings, none of these prior studies can rationalize trust and 
trustworthiness as an equilibrium phenomenon among anonymous, randomly matched players who have 
no information about the history of play of their partners as is the case in our study.
 3  Thus they do not 
address one of the main questions we pose here: whether the mechanism that supports trust and reciprocity 
comes about through community-wide enforcement (fear of a contagious wave of distrust and confiscation) 
or from the provision of information on individual behavior (that affects the behavior of both the observed 
and those deciding whether to trust) or possibly some combination of both.  Our nested treatment design 
allows us to carefully assess the extent to which these two mechanisms are operative.  Second, prior 
research does not explain why the length of reputational information on second movers should matter; 
Keser (2003) for example, simply documents that a longer history of reputational information generates 
greater  trust  and  reciprocity  than  does  a  shorter  history.    By  contrast,  here  we  provide  a  theoretical 
explanation for why the history length should matter and we provide some evidence in support of that 
prediction.  Finally all prior studies have only examined the case where information on the past behavior 
of second movers is freely provided.  However, in many real-world situations, reputational data are private 
information gathered by third parties and are only made available to individuals at some cost, e.g., credit 
reports.  Thus we go a step further and (in one treatment) consider how behavior is affected if information 
on second movers is costly and second movers don’t know whether information about them has been 
purchased  or  not.  This  asymmetric  information  treatment  enables  us  to  consider  whether  it  is  the 
availability of (costly) information (and perhaps less importantly the content of that information) that may 
suffice to sustain cooperative behavior. 
Finally, we note that our paper is also related to the literature exploring the historic development of 
economic  institutions  among  strangers.  Greif  (1989,  1993)  and  Milgrom  et  al.  (1990)  model  a  large 
number of traders who are randomly paired with each other in each period. Each pair is presumed to play 
a game similar to the trust game, where one party has an incentive to cheat the other by supplying goods 
of inferior quality or reneging on promises to make future payments. In this literature, institutions are seen 
as a way of avoiding the inefficiency of noncooperative equilibria. Greif and Milgrom et al. argue that the 
exchange of information on the identity of cheaters or the development of a mechanism which strengthens 
the power of enforcement can help to sustain cooperation. Dal Bo (2007) shows how random matching 
and a community enforcement mechanism can support unequal caste-type systems among identical agents 
that would not be sustainable under the standard two-agent fixed-matching protocol. 
                                            
3 Many experimental studies find that trust and reciprocity prevail under the conditions of complete anonymity and one-shot interaction. As these 
behaviors are inconsistent with all participants being payoff maximizers, they are often explained by psychological factors such as fairness, 
altruism, and expectation of inequality aversion etc. See, e.g., Berg et al. (1995), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Camerer 
(2003) provides a survey.   7 
3. The Model 
We briefly describe the model and its predictions for our experimental design.  We adopt the notation 
of Xie and Lee (2011). The set of players   is partitioned into two sets of equal size, the 
set of investors   and the set of trustees   In each period, each 
investor is matched with a trustee according to the uniform random matching rule, and they play the 
binary trust game as a stage game. This procedure is infinitely repeated, and each player's total payoff is 
the expected sum of his stage game payoffs discounted by  . 
The trust game we study is depicted in Figure 1.
4  At the beginning of the game, the investor is 
endowed with an amount ? ∈ (0,1).  If the investor decides not to invest, the game ends. The investor’s 
payoff is ? (the value of his outside option) and the trustee’s payoff is 0.  If the investor chooses to invest 
his endowment, this choice yields an immediate gross return of 1, but the division of this gross return is up 
to the trustee, who moves second.  If the investor has invested, the trustee decides whether to keep all of 
the gross return for a payoff of 1 for himself and 0 for the investor or to return a fraction 0 < ? < 1 to the 
investor, earning a payoff of 1 − ? for himself.  Throughout we shall assume that  .  
   
 
Figure 1: The Trust Game 
 
If the game is played once, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for the investor not to invest as 
the  trustee  will  always  choose  to  play  Keep.    But  since ? < 1, this  equilibrium  is  not  efficient.  The 
efficient outcome, where the investor invests and the trustee returns, can be achieved under the conditions 
of the ―contagious equilibrium‖ of the infinitely repeated game, even if players are anonymously and 
                                            
4 In the trust game we study, both players have binary choice sets, a simplification necessary for the theoretical analysis that follows. 
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randomly re-matched after each period.  We now turn to characterizing this contagious equilibrium. 
3.1 Contagious equilibrium 
 
Define the action No Invest as a ―defection‖ by an investor and the action Keep as a defection by a 
trustee. Define d-type players as those whose history includes a defection either by themselves or by any 
of their randomly assigned partners. Otherwise, players are defined as c-type (cooperative) players. 
 
Definition: The "contagious strategy" is defined as follows: An investor chooses Invest if she is a c-type 
and No Invest if she is a d-type. A trustee chooses Return if he is a c-type and Keep if he is a d-type. 
 
The idea of the contagious strategy is that trust applies to the community as a whole and cannot be 
applied  to  individuals  because  of  random  anonymous  matchings.  Therefore,  a  single  defection  by  a 
member means the end of trust in the whole community and a player who experiences dishonest behavior 
starts defecting against all of his opponents (Kandori, 1992). It is shown below that we can define payoffs 
for the trust game which allow trust and reciprocity to be a sequential equilibrium for any finite population. 
To show that the contagious strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium, it is sufficient to show that 
one-shot deviations are unprofitable after any history. In particular, Xie and Lee (2011) provide these 
conditions in the following lemma which puts constraints on investors’ and trustees’ incentives not to 
deviate from the contagious strategy both on the equilibrium path and off the equilibrium path.  
Before stating the lemma, we first introduce the terms ) ( f  and  ) ( g which are functions of the 
period discount factor  ? --for details of the construction of these terms see Appendix A.  Conceptually, 
) ( f  represents the discounted sum of expected future payoffs – the gain-- to a trustee from not initiating 
a  contagious  wave  of defection  when all  the  other  players in  the  community  are  c-types,  and  ) ( g  
represents the gain to a d-type trustee from deviating from defection (i.e., resuming to play Return) given 
that there is just one d-type investor and one d-type trustee (himself) in the current period. Thus,  ) ( f  
and  ) ( g  are the discounted, expected payoffs to a trustee from avoiding triggering or slowing down the 
contagious strategy in the current period in different states of the world (i.e., when there are different 
numbers of d-type investors and d-type trustees in the community).  
 
Lemma: The contagious strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium if 
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Condition  (1)  controls  the  investor’s  incentive  to  deviate  from  the  contagious  strategy  off  the   9 
equilibrium path. Due to the one-sided nature of the incentive problem, Invest is the best response to 
Return, so the investor has no incentive to deviate on the equilibrium path. Condition (1) requires that a d-
type investor defect forever (never go back to Invest), even if she believes there is only one d-type trustee, 
which  is  the  most  favorable  situation  for  investment.  The  left  hand  side  of  inequality  (1),  a ,  is  the 
investor’s opportunity cost from choosing Invest, and the right hand side of inequality (1) is the expected 
payoff to Invest given that there is only one d-type trustee so that the other 𝑛 − 1 trustees will choose 
Return.   
An implication of condition (1) is that the existence of the contagious equilibrium requires a high 
outside  option.  For  the  development  of  a  cooperative  social  norm,  the  concept  of  the  contagious 
equilibrium  requires  a  harsh  punishment  scheme.  Not  only  are  those  who  deviate  from  the  desired 
behavior punished, but a player who fails to punish is in turn punished himself (Kandori, 1992). Thus an 
investor must defect forever once she is cheated upon. In order to prevent d-type investors from investing 
again off the equilibrium path, the outside option a must be sufficiently high. Notice that condition (1) 
becomes more restrictive when the group size 𝑛 becomes larger. Outside of the laboratory, anonymous 
interaction typically requires a large group size. Thus condition (1) implies that the contagious equilibrium 
may be more difficult to sustain in the field. 
Condition (2) controls the trustee’s incentive to deviate from the contagious strategy both on the 
equilibrium path and off the equilibrium path. The first part of condition (2),  b f  ) ( , requires that the 
trustee’s one-period gain from defection, b , must be less than or equal to the gains from not initiating a 
defection in the current period, ) ( f . Thus, a trustee will not start a defection in the current period. The 
second  part  of  condition  (2),  b g  ) ( ,  implies  that the period loss from attempting  to slow down  a 
contagious wave of defection, b , must be greater than the gains from slowing down the contagion when 
there  are  already  other  d-type  players  in  the  community.  The  latter  restriction  controls  the  trustee’s 
incentive not to deviate off the equilibrium path. Finally, to show that there always exists a b  between 
) ( g  and  ) ( f , Xie and Lee (2011) show that  ) ( g  is less than  ) ( f  for any   greater than 0 given 
any finite population size. Intuitively, the trustee’s payoff from not initiating the contagion (i.e., ) ( f ) is 
larger than the trustee’s payoff from slowing down the contagious procedure (i.e., ) ( g ), since in the 
former  case  the  trustee in  consideration is the only potential d-type  player  in  the  community  and  the 
contagious procedure stops completely for the current period if this trustee chooses not to defect, while in 
the latter case the effect of this trustee choosing not to defect becomes much smaller with the existence of 
other d-type players in the community. 
The lemma above is used in the proof of the following theorem, which states that we can find values 
for ? and ? in the trust game that satisfy the sufficient conditions of the lemma. 
 
Theorem (Xie and Lee 2011): Consider the model described above where   players are randomly 

4 2  n  10 
paired each period to play the infinitely repeated trust game. Then for any   and  , there exist   and 
 such that (i)  1 0    b a ; and (ii) the contagious strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium in 
which (Invest, Return) is the outcome in every pair and every period along the equilibrium path.  
While other repeated game equilibria may exist under these conditions, the contagious equilibrium where 
(Invest, Return) is the outcome in every period is the most efficient of these equilibria, and therefore the 
focus of our analysis. 
 
Remark 1: Note that the contagious equilibrium does not exist in the finitely repeated trust game by a 
simple backward induction argument. 
3.2 Equilibria when information about trustees is available 
 
In  this  paper,  we  consider  as  an  alternative  to  anonymous,  community-wide  enforcement, 
environments where information on an individual trustee’s past history of play can be observed by an 
investor prior to the investor making a decision to invest or not.  We focus on the case of one-sided 
information flow (investors only view information on trustees and not vice versa) as this seems most 
appropriate for the trust game with its one-sided incentive problem, and because this information set-up 
also follows that of many real-world examples, e.g., credit markets, e-commerce. Specifically, we consider 
two different trustee histories that may be available to the investor: 1) ―minimal information‖, where the 
investor observes only the action chosen by the trustee in the prior period (Keep, Return, or no choice) and 
2)  ―full  information‖,  where  the  trustee’s  past  history  of  decisions in  all  prior  random  matches  with 
investors is revealed to the investor with whom the trustee is currently matched. We further consider an 
environment  where  full  information  is  available  to  investors  but  at  a  cost, ? > 0.  The  following 
propositions apply to such environments with costless or costly information on the trustee’s history of play. 
 
Proposition 1: When information on the past behavior of trustees is free and full, the contagious strategy 
is not an equilibrium strategy. 
 
Proof: Consider the case where a d-type investor meets a c-type trustee in the current period. Under full 
information, the d-type investor can identify the trustee as a c-type player. According to the contagious 
strategy, the trustee should choose Return-given-Invest, and the investor, being a d-type should choose No 
Invest. However, given the trustee’s strategy, the investor has an incentive to choose Invest since she can 
not only gain  a b  in  the  current  period  but she  can also  slow  down  the  contagious  process by  not 
changing the current c-type trustee into a d-type trustee.  
 
If the contagious strategy is no longer an equilibrium strategy, a natural question that arises is what is an 
 n a
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equilibrium strategy when information is available on trustees?  We propose the following: 
 
Proposition 2:  When information on the history of a trustee’s play is free and full and  , b    there exists 
an equilibrium in which the trustee continues to play the contagious strategy but investors play a strategy 
that is conditional on the information revealed about the trustee.  Specifically, an investor chooses Invest 
if the trustee’s  history of play reveals  the  trustee to  be  a  c-type  and the investor  chooses  No  Invest 
otherwise. 
 
Corollary 1:  When minimal information is provided freely, the strategy described in Proposition 2 is an 
equilibrium strategy only for a knife-edge condition b   . 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 together indicate that if investors condition their investment decision 
on information about a trustee’s prior behavior, an equilibrium involving complete trust and reciprocity 
will be easier to sustain in the case of full information than in the case of minimal information. Intuitively, 
the discount factor cannot be too high in the equilibrium under minimal information, since a d-type trustee 
will have an incentive to attempt to remove his bad reputation by engaging in one-shot good behavior in 
the current period so as to appear to be a c-type and attract investment in future periods. This problem 
does not arise in the case of full information because in that case it is impossible for a d-type trustee to 
change his type as perceived by investors. 
Our  final  proposition  applies  to  environments  where  the  investor  may  choose  to  purchase  full 
information about a trustee’s past history of play at a per period cost of ? > 0.  The information purchase 
decision is private information; the trustee does not know whether or not his matched investor has chosen 
to purchase information. For this environment, we propose the following asymmetric equilibrium: only a 
fraction  of  investors  choose  to  purchase  information  (or  equivalently,  investors  choose  to  purchase 
information with some probability); a fraction of trustees always choose Return and the remaining trustees 
always choose Keep.  For some intuition as to why there is a mixture of behavior in the equilibrium of this 
environment, suppose that all trustees always chose Return. Then investors would not need to purchase 
information, since the value of information is to distinguish trustees with a good reputation from those 
with a bad reputation. However if none of the investors purchased information yet they still invested with 
a positive probability, then trustees would have strong incentives to defect. Therefore, investors should 
play a mixed strategy with regard to the information purchase decision, provided the cost is small enough.  
 
Proposition 3:  When information on the history of trustees’ play is full and not too costly and  , b  
there exists an equilibrium characterized by a vector of probabilities,  ?,?,? , where investors purchase   12 
information with probability  ? < 1, choose Invest if this information reveals the trustee to have always 
chosen Return, and choose No Invest otherwise. Investors who do not choose to purchase information 
choose Invest with probability  ?.  Fraction ? < 1 of trustees always choose Return and fraction 1 − ? 
always choose Keep. The most efficient such equilibrium obtains where ? = 1. 
 
Corollary  2:    When  full  information  about  trustees  is  available  for  purchase  there  also  exists  an 
inefficient, pure strategy equilibrium where investors never purchase information and never choose Invest 
and no trustee chooses Return. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 3 says that when full information is available and not too costly (the cost conditions are 
given in the proof of Proposition 3), there exists an equilibrium in which only some investors purchase 
information about trustees and, consequently some trustees play Keep.  Hence, an implication of making 
full information costly is that trust and reciprocity may be lower than when full information is costless. 
While there are many equilibria with positive levels of trust and reciprocity when information is costly 
(these are indexed by ?), we focus our analysis (as we have done previously) on the most efficient of these 
equilibria,  which  obtains  when  investors  choosing  not  to  purchase  information  always  choose  Invest 
(? = 1). 
Of course, as stated in Corollary 2, the inefficient equilibrium where all investors choose not to 
purchase information and never choose Invest and all trustees choose Keep always remains an equilibrium 
possibility.  Thus, there is an empirical question as to whether information will be purchased in the costly 
information environment.  We examine the latter question as well as all of our other theoretical predictions 
by designing and analyzing results from a laboratory experiment. We now turn to this exercise. 
 
4. Experimental Design 
 
Our  main  treatment  variable  concerns  the  information  available to  investors  in  advance  of their 
investment decision though we also consider whether the horizon is indefinite or finite. We have five 
treatments. All treatments except the second one involve supergames with indefinite horizons. In the first, 
―no information‖ treatment (henceforth referred to as ―No‖), investors only know their own history of play 
and payoff in each period. Nevertheless, in this environment, full trust and reciprocity (the play of Invest 
and Return) can be supported under random anonymous matching via the contagious strategy.  The second, 
no information, finite horizon treatment (referred to as ―No-Finite‖) is similar to the first treatment in that 
subjects have no information about their randomly matched partner in each period but in this treatment 
subjects play the trust game for a known finite number of periods. In that case, trust and reciprocity cannot   13 
be  supported  by  the  contagious  strategy  as  noted  in  Remark  1.  In  the  third,  ―minimal  information‖ 
treatment (referred to as ―Min‖), investors are informed of the prior-period decision of their current paired 
trustee, i.e., whether that trustee chose Keep or Return in the prior period of the current supergame, in the 
event the trustee had the opportunity to make a choice in the prior period; if the trustee did not have an 
opportunity to make a decision in the prior period, the information reported to the investor is ―No Choice‖.  
In the fourth ―full information‖ treatment (referred to as ―Info’’), investors are told the frequencies with 
which their currently matched trustee chose Keep or Return out of the total number of opportunities the 
trustee had to make either choice over all prior periods of the current supergame – called the Keep or 
Return ratios. The latter information is all that is necessary to label a trustee as either a c- or d-type, 
consistent with Propositions 1-3. In addition, investors in the Info treatment were also shown the trustee’s 
actual, period-by-period history of play (Return, Keep or No Choice) for up to 10 prior periods of the 
current supergame.
5  Finally, in the fifth, ―costly information‖ treatment (referred to as ―Cost‖), investors 
are not automatically provided with information on their paired trustee’s previous choices as in the Info 
treatment;  instead,  individual  investors  can  choose  to  purchase  and  privately  view  the  same,  full 
information record that was freely provided in the Info treatment at a small per period cost of c>0 points. 
Each of our experimental sessions involved a single group of size 2𝑛 = 6. We chose to work with 
groups of 6 subjects for several reasons. First, and most importantly, condition (1) for the existence of the 
contagious equilibrium in the trust game (where ? < ?) is more difficult to satisfy when n is large. On the 
other hand, we did not want the expected frequency of repeat matchings to be as high as in the minimal 
group size of 4. Second, we wanted to give the contagious equilibrium a chance to work; it is well known 
that the contagious equilibrium involving complete trust and reciprocity can collapse due to noise or 
trembles, and such noise is likely to increase with the size of the group.
6 
We chose  a discount factor 80 .    and  an  indefinitely  repeated supergame was implemented as 
follows. At the start of each supergame, subjects were randomly assigned a role as either the investor or 
trustee  and  they  remained  in  that  role  for  all  periods  of  the  supergame.
7   This design  gave  subjects 
experience with playing both roles across many supergames .  In each period of a supergame, the 3 
investors and 3 trustees were randomly and anonymously matched with one another for a single play of 
the stage game with all matchings being equally likely.
8  After playing the stage game, the results of the 
                                            
5 While we limited the period-by-period history of actions about a trustee to a maximum of 10 prior periods, the reported frequencies with which a 
trustee played Keep or Return were for all periods of the current supergame and this fact was made clear to subjects. Note further that the 
expected duration of a supergame, given our choice of ? = .80, is just 5 periods. 
6 Camera and Casari (2009) offer a similar justification for their choice of a group size of 4. Duffy and Ochs (2009) look at groups of size 6 as 
well as larger groups of size 14 and find cooperation rates under random anonymous matchings are twice as high on average in groups of size 6 as 
compared with groups of size 14. 
7 In the instructions (Appendix B) we use neutral word ―First Mover‖ for investor, ―Second Mover‖ for trustee, and ―sequence‖ for indefinitely 
repeated supergame.  We also use ―A‖ ―B‖ ―C‖ ―D‖ to denote the investor and trustee’s choices. See Appendix for instructions. 
8 This is the same matching protocol used by Duffy and Ochs (2009). Camera and Casari (2009) use a matching protocol wherein no two subjects 
are  matched  to  play  more  than  one  supergame.  In  all  treatments  of  our  design,  the  assignment  of  roles  (Investor,  Trustee)  was  randomly 
determined at the start of each new supergame thereby distinguishing one supergame from the next.   14 
game were reported to each pair of subjects and a 10-sided die was rolled. If the die came up 8 or 9, the 
supergame  was  declared  over;  otherwise  the  game  continued  on  with  another  period.
9 Subjects were 
randomly rematched before playing the next period, though they remained in the same role in all periods 
of that supergame.
10  We told subjects that we would play a number of ―sequences‖ (i.e., supergames) but 
we did not specify how many.  For transparency and credibility purposes, we had the subjects take turns 
rolling the 10-sided die themselves and calling out the result. Our design thus implements random and 
anonymous matching, a discount factor 80 .   , and the stationarity associated with an infinite horizon. 
In the finitely repeated game subjects were randomly matched in every round and randomly assigned 
new roles at the start of each finitely repeated game just as in the indefinitely repeated game. However in 
the finite horizon treatment, no die was used as subjects were fully informed that each game would last 
exactly 5 periods. We chose a finite length of 5 periods as this is equal to the expected duration of an 
indefinitely  repeated  supergame,  1/(1-δ)  under  our  choice  of  80 .   .  Subjects  in  the  finite  horizon 
treatment played a total of eight 5-period games so that we would have approximately as many periods of 
data (40 periods) as in our indefinite horizon treatments.   
The parameterization of the stage game used in all experimental sessions is given in Figure 2. In this 
figure, the terminal nodes of the tree give the number of points each type of subject earned under the three 
possible  outcomes  for  each  stage  game  played. This  parameterization  of  the  game  was  chosen  to  be 
consistent with our theoretical assumption that ? = 35 < ? = 45 < 100  and also satisfies the conditions 
(1) and (2) of the Lemma in the prior section given the choice of  𝑛 = 3 pairs of players and the induced 
period  discount  factor  80 .    used  in  the  sessions  with  indefinite  horizon.
11  While  other 
parameterizations are possible, we chose a parameterization that is not at the boundary of the conditions 
(1)-(2), but instead among randomly matched players.
12  The cost of purchasing information in the Cost 
treatment was set at 2 points, and satisfies restrictions given in the Proof of Proposition 3. The experiment 
was programmed and conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
                                            
9 Note that the die roll also provides a randomization device by which individuals can coordinate a halt to a contagious punishment phase as 
detailed in Ellison (1994).  
10 In all of the informational mechanisms discussed above, information on the trustee’ behavior in previous supergames does not carry over when 
a new supergame begins. In the treatments where information is available, it is always available from the start of the second period of each 
supergame. 
11 The payoffs used in the experiment are those shown in Figure 2 which are the payoffs of Figure 1 multiplied by 100. Using a Mathematica 
program we calculated the value of f(δ) = 60.2 and g(δ) = 24.2 given our choice of  n = 3  and  δ = 0.8. So the choice of b satisfies condition 
(2): g(δ) ≤ b ≤ f(δ). The program is available upon request. 
12 In many experimental implementations of trust games, the trustee is given a positive endowment so as to avoid the possibility that the investor 
feels compelled (out of some sense of fairness) to invest. While this may be an issue in one-shot games, it seems less relevant in our repeated 
random-matching trust game, where (as we discuss below) all players are equally likely to be assigned the role of investor or trustee at the start of 
each new supergame, and are paid for all periods of all supergames played. Therefore, each subject in our design is effectively given the same 
―endowment‖ in expected terms. Related to the real life examples that motivate our paper, e.g., borrowing in credit markets, it also seems more 
reasonable to assume that only the first mover (bank) has an outside option (endowment); if a transaction does not occur, then the bank keeps its 
money while the borrower earns 0.    15 
 
Figure 2: Stage Game Parameterization Used in the Experiment. 
 
We used a within-subjects design in all sessions involving indefinite horizon supergames. Subjects 
began to play under one information condition and were switched to a second condition (and to a third in 
some sessions).  In practice, there are at least 30 periods under each information condition – see Table 1 
below.  The treatment was stopped when the total number of periods under the treatment information 
condition exceeded 30 periods and the then-current supergame ended naturally via the die roll. Subjects 
were only informed of the change in an information condition when the switch took place, i.e., they did 
not know that a change was coming or our rule for implementing the duration of each treatment. For the 
sessions involving finite horizon supergames, there is only one treatment for the entire session. 
We have in total 18 experimental observations (16 sessions) which we divide up into three main sets.  
The first set of 8 sessions (observations) examines whether providing investors with no information or 
minimal  information  on  a  trustee’s  prior  behavior  affects  trust  and  reciprocity.  We  conducted  four 
―No_Min‖  sessions  (sessions  that  began  with  ―no  information‖  and  later  switched  to  ―minimal 
information‖), and four ―Min_No‖ sessions following the opposite treatment order. In the second set of 2 
sessions (4 observations) we explore whether the indefiniteness of the horizon matters for the level of trust 
and reciprocity observed under no information.  We report results from two ―No-Finite‖ sessions where 
subjects played the trust game under ―no information‖ but for a known finite number of periods. The third 
set of 6 sessions (observations) investigates the effect of a longer history of information regarding trustees’ 
prior  behavior  on  trust  and  reciprocity  and  whether  the  possibility  to  purchase  that  ―full‖  history  of 
information  at  a  small  cost  affects  the  frequency  of  trust  and  reciprocity.  We  conducted  three 
―No_Info_Cost‖  sessions and three ―Info_No_Cost‖  sessions.  (Recall  No  means  no  information,  Info 
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means information and Cost means costly information). We reversed the order of the first two treatments 
to examine whether the treatment order matters. The Cost treatment is always the last treatment in this 
third set of sessions, as we wanted subjects to have experience with the full information (―Info‖) treatment 
before they faced a decision as to whether to purchase that same amount of information at a small cost. 
There are always 6 participants in all sessions involving indefinite horizon supergames (the first and third 
set). For the second set of sessions that involve finite horizon supergames, there are 12 participants who 
were divided into two groups of 6 at the beginning of the session and never had interactions with subjects 
in the other group during the entire session, so we can treat each group as an independent observation. The 
Instructions used in the ―Min_No‖ and ―Info_No_Cost‖ sessions are provided in Appendix B (instructions 
for the other treatment orderings are similar). 
The motivations for this experimental design follow from our theoretical model.  First, under our 
parameterization  of  the  model  the  contagious  strategy  supports  a  social  norm  of  complete  trust  and 
reciprocity among randomly  matched anonymous players when there is an indefinite horizon and  no 
information on trustees is available.  However, we cannot exclude other equilibria, e.g., the social norm of 
no trust-and-reciprocity is another one. Thus it remains an empirical question as to whether community-
wide  enforcement  suffices  to  support  a  social  norm  of  trust  and  reciprocity  and  whether  different 
informational mechanisms can help select different social norms. On the other hand, in the treatment that 
involves supergames with a finite horizon and no information on trustees, the contagious equilibrium does 
not exist. Therefore, comparing sessions with a finite horizon and those with an indefinite horizon under 
no information helps us evaluate whether indefiniteness of the horizon matters as theory suggests. 
Second, since the collection, storage and dissemination of information is always costly for a society, 
a question of practical interest is how much reputational information is needed to significantly enhance the 
frequencies of trust and reciprocity. That is one motivation for why we consider both the Min and Info 
treatments.  A  second  motivation  comes  from  Proposition  2  and  its  Corollary  which  predict  that  full 
information on trustees can sustain an equilibrium involving complete trust and reciprocity under more 
general conditions than when there is only  minimal information on trustees.  Notice further, that the 
information  reported  to  subjects  in  the  Min  treatment  nests  that  of  the  No  treatment  while  the  Info 
treatment nests that of the Min treatment.  
Finally, the Cost treatment recognizes that information on trustees’ past history would be costly to 
gather and that such costs would likely be paid by the information consumers, i.e., the investors. The Cost 
treatment thus  addresses the  role of costly  reputational  information  on trust and  reciprocity—a  more 
empirically relevant setting.  The frequency of information purchases by investors is not revealed and 
importantly, trustees are not informed as to whether their paired investor purchased information about 
them or not. This asymmetry of information is public knowledge. Thus, on the one hand, if some fraction 
of  investors  choose  to  purchase  information  about  trustees  (and  act  according  to  the  content  of  that   17 
information), their decisions can potentially provide a positive externality to the whole community due to 
the anonymity of matching and information purchase decisions. On the other hand, if trustees believe that 
some  fraction  of  investors  will  not  purchase  information,  they  may  behave  similarly  as  in  the  No 
information treatment.  Our Proposition 3 predicts this kind of mixed equilibrium. 
All subjects were recruited from the undergraduate populations of the University of Pittsburgh and 
Carnegie  Mellon  University.    No  subject  had  any  prior  experience  participating  in  our  experiment. 
Subjects were given $5 for showing up on time and completing the experiment and they were also paid 
their earnings from all periods of all supergames played.  Subjects accumulated points given their stage 
game choices (points are shown in Figure 2, the cost of information is set 2 points).  Total points from all 
periods of all supergames were converted into dollars at a fixed and known rate of 1 point = ½ cent. In the 
finite horizon treatment, subjects played half as many periods as in the indefinitely repeated game so we 





No. of Supergames 
Treat1/Treat2/Treat3 




No_Min1  7 / 9  38 / 46  $5.38 / $6.73 
No_Min2  5 / 8  34 / 37  $6.39 / $8.00 
No_Min3  8 / 2  35 / 37  $5.77 / $9.03 
No_Min4  9 / 8  39 / 35  $6.72 / $6.91 
Min_No1  9 / 8  44 / 37  $8.67 / $8.44 
Min_No2   5 / 11  38 / 41  $6.79 / $5.75 
Min_No3  9 / 7  34 / 38  $4.82 / $7.93 
Min_No4  13 / 5  41 / 38  $5.59 / $3.92 
No-Finite1  8  40  $8.95 
No-Finite2  8  40  $13.83 
No-Finite3  8  40  $17.08 
No-Finite4  8  40  $16.43 
No_Info_Cost1  6 / 7 / 9  42 / 37/ 40  $7.20 / $8.60 / $9.86 
No_Info_Cost2  11 / 6 / 7  35 / 35 / 36  $7.13 / $7.94 / $7.92 
No_Info_Cost3  7 / 8 / 8  34 / 32 / 31  $6.66 / $7.03 / $7.07 
Info_No_Cost1  5 / 9 / 7  44 / 43 / 32  $9.92 / $8.37 / $7.62 
Info_No_Cost2  8 / 4 / 8  35 / 43 / 35  $7.78 / $4.68 / $5.03 
Info_No_Cost3  7 / 9 / 7  34 / 33 / 34  $7.25 / $5.65 / $5.53 
Average  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Table 1: All Experimental Observations   18 
Table 1 provides basic characteristics of all sessions, specifically the number of repeated games for 
each treatment, 1, 2 or 3 of the session, the total number of periods played in each of those treatments, as 
well as the average payoff earned by subjects in each treatment.  As Table 1 reveals, in sessions with 
multiple treatments, the two or three treatments of each session involved roughly similar numbers of 
periods which (as noted earlier) was by construction.  Subjects earned on average, $16.40 in addition to 
their $5 show-up fee.  The first set of 8 sessions all finished within 1.5 hours, the second set of 2 sessions 
finished  in  about  1  hour  and  the  third  set  of  6  sessions  finished  within  2  hours.    In  the  following 
subsections, we report results from the first, second and third set of sessions respectively, and then we 
analyze how players made use of their personal histories and how investors made use of the various 
amounts of information provided to them about trustees. 
 
5.1  No_Min and Min_No Sessions 
 
We first analyze whether a social norm of complete (100%) trust and reciprocity emerges  in the 
indefinitely  repeated  game  when  there  is  no  information  on  trustees  and  we  compare  that  case  with 
treatments  where  ―minimal‖  information  on  trustees’  prior-period  action  –Keep  or  Return--  is  freely 
provided. We first calculated the average frequencies of 1) invest, 2) return conditional on investment 
(return-given-invest) and 3) invest-and-return for each No_Min or Min_No session.
 13   Table 2 reports the 
average of these session-level frequencies.
14 To aid in reading these tables  where the treatment orders 
differ, the clear (unshaded) areas indicate average frequencies for the No treatment and the grey (shaded) 
areas indicate average frequencies for  the Min treatment.  Table 2  provides  support for our first   two 
experimental findings. 
 






Frequency of  
Invest 
No_Min  0.487  0.699  4 
Min_No  0.467  0.508  4 
Frequency of  
Return-given-Invest 
No_Min  0.605  0.851  4 
Min_No  0.714  0.662  4 
Frequency of  
Invest-and-Return 
No_Min  0.296  0.610  4 
Min_No  0.348  0.384  4 
Average  Payoff  per 
Period (in points) 
No_Min  33  40  4 
Min_No  33  34  4 
Table 2: Average Frequencies and Per Period Payoffs for Min_No and No_Min Sessions 
 
Finding 1:  A social norm of complete trust and reciprocity (100% Invest-and-Return) is not achieved in 
                                            
13 We will sometimes equivalently refer to Invest as ―trust,‖ Return-given-Invest as ―reciprocate‖ and Invest-and-Return as ―trust and reciprocity.‖ 
14 Average frequencies in Tables 3-4 and Table C1 (Appendix C) are also constructed using the same approach.   19 
the absence of information on trustees’ behavior, contrary to a theoretical possibility described by the 
contagious strategy. 
 
While the payoffs for the game were chosen so that the contagious strategy supports an equilibrium 
of complete trust and reciprocity, other equilibrium possibilities cannot be ruled out, for example zero trust 
and reciprocity by all players remains an equilibrium strategy. As Table 2 reveals, the frequency of Invest-
and-Return averages around one-third across all sessions of the No treatment and is never zero.  Similarly, 
the observed frequencies of Invest (trust), Return-given-Invest (reciprocity) are also less than 100% but 
considerably greater than zero across all sessions of the No treatment. 
Our next finding makes use of our within-subjects design to compare behavior with and without 
minimal information. 
 
Finding 2:  The free provision of minimal information to investors on the prior-period action of their 
matched trustee leads to a significant increase in trust and reciprocity but only if the provision of this 
information follows the treatment in which investors receive no information about trustees. 
 
For the No_Min sessions, the provision of minimal information about the trustee’s prior-period play 
in the second half of a session leads to marginally significantly larger frequencies of Invest, Return, and 
Invest-and-Return  compared  with  the  corresponding  4  session-level  frequencies  in  the  NO  treatment 
(Wilcoxon  signed  ranks  test,  p=0.0625  for  all  three  tests).
15   However,  when  minimal information is 
provided in the first half of a session as in the Min_No treatment, then none of the frequencies of Invest, 
Return-given-Invest, and Invest-and-Return are significantly different from the corresponding frequencies  
in the No treatment (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p>0.4 for all three tests, 4 session-level obs.).   
       Since the subjects were not informed of the second treatment until the change in treatment m id-way 
through a session, we can regard the first treatment of each session as an independent observation that was 
not influenced by other treatments. We find that regardless of whether the first treatment is No or Min 
information, the 8 session-level frequencies of Invest and Invest-and-Return are not significantly different 
from one another.  However, the frequency of Return-given-Invest is significantly higher when minimal 
information is available in the first treatment than when it is not (Robust Rank Order test, p<0.05
16).  The 
latter  finding  implies  that  the  provision  of  minimal  information  has  a  more  significant  effect  on  the 
behavior of trustees than on the behavior of the recipients of minimal information-- the investors!   
                                            
15 For this nonparametric test and all nonparametric tests that follow, we always use session-level treatment averages as our unit of observation. 
16 We use the robust rank order test rather than the more commonly used Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test as the latter presumes that the two samples 
being compared come from distributions with the same second- and higher order moments and we have no a priori reason for believing this is the 
case.   20 
       If we restrict attention to just the second treatment of each session, after subjects have gained some 
experience, we find similar results: regardless of whether the second treatment is No or Min information, 
the 8 session-level frequencies of Invest and Invest-and-Return are not significantly different from one 
another,  but  the  frequency  of  Return-given-Invest  is  marginally  significantly  higher  when  minimal 
information is available than when it is not (Robust Rank Order test, p=.10). 
We next consider all 8 session-level observations from the No-treatment and find that there are no 
significant differences in the frequencies of Invest, Return-given-Invest, and Invest-and-Return when the 
No treatment is in the first half of the No_Min sessions or in the second half of the Min_No sessions.  
However, using the 8 session-level observations from the Min treatment, all frequencies of Invest, Return-
given-Invest, and Invest-and-Return are significantly higher when minimal information is provided in the 
second half of the No_Min sessions than when it is provided in the first half of the Min_No sessions 
(Robust Rank Order test, p<0.05 for all three tests). Together, these findings suggest that when minimal 
information is provided to subjects who have suffered from the absence of reputational information as in 
our No_Min sessions, they learn to use the minimal information more effectively than subjects who begin 
interacting with minimal information and then lose access to that information as in our Min_No sessions. 
 
5.2 Finite Horizon Treatment with No Information 
 
        We next focus on the no information environment of our baseline treatment and consider the effect of 
changing the horizon from an indefinite one to a finite one where subjects play the trust game for a known, 
fixed horizon of 5 periods. This finite horizon treatment rules out the possible use of contagious strategies 
supporting full trust and reciprocity via standard  backward induction arguments.  Table 3 reports the 
average  frequencies  of  Invest,  Return-given-Invest  and  Invest-and-Return  for  this  treatment  from  4 
observations involving 6 subjects each who played eight 5-period trust games under no information. 
 
  Averages over All 5 
Periods of 8 Games 
Averages over 1-4 
Periods of 8 Games 
No. of 
Sessions/Obs. 
Frequency of Invest  0.544  0.580  4 
Frequency of  Return-
given-Invest  0.577  0.591  4 
Frequency of  
Invest-and-Return 
0.379  0.419  4 
Average Payoff per 
Period (in points)  35  36  4 
Table 3: Average Frequencies and Per Period Payoffs for No-Finite Sessions 
 
These averages are reported for all 40 periods (first column) or for a total of 32 periods of the 8 finitely   21 
repeated games with the exception of the fifth and final period (so as to minimize the impact of end-game 
effects).  Regardless of which averages we use, we find none of the aggregate frequencies of Invest, 
Return-given-Invest  and  Invest-and-Return  are  significantly  different  in  the  ―No-Finite‖  treatment  as 
compared with those in the first treatment of ―No_Min‖ and ―No_Info_Cost‖ sessions (Robust Rank 
Order test, p > 0.1 for all three tests, 11 session level obs.).  We summarize this result as follows:   
 
Finding 3:  There is no significant difference between the aggregate frequencies of invest, return-given-
invest and invest-and-return in the finite horizon no information treatment and in the indefinite horizon no 
information treatment. This result does not depend on whether we use data from all 5 periods or just the 
first four periods of the No-Finite treatment.  
 
5.3 No_Info_Cost and Info_No_Cost Sessions 
 
        Table 4 reports the frequencies of Invest, Return-given-Invest, and Invest-and-Return from the third 
set of sessions that involved three different treatments. As before, the clear (unshaded) cells of Table 4 
show frequencies from the No treatment, the grey shaded cells show frequencies from the Info treatment, 
and now the light grey shaded cells  show frequencies from the Cost treatment (always the 3
rd treatment). 
 








Frequency of  
Invest 
No_Info_Cost  0.632  0.854  0.893  3 
Info_No_Cost  0.817  0.435  0.583  3 
Frequency of Return-
given-Invest 
No_Info_Cost  0.694  0.920  0.885  3 
Info_No_Cost  0.941  0.561  0.817  3 
Frequency of  
Invest-and-Return 
No_Info_Cost  0.434  0.786  0.796  3 
Info_No_Cost  0.770  0.264  0.502  3 
Average Payoff per 
Period (in points) 
No_Info_Cost  38  45  46  3 
Info_No_Cost  44  32  37  3 
Table 4: Average Frequencies and Per Period Payoffs for No_Info_Cost and Info_No_Cost Sessions 
 
Recall that in the Info treatment the investor sees the matched trustee’s aggregate Ratio of Return in all 
previous periods of the current supergame as well as the trustees’ actions chosen in up to the 10 most 
recent  periods  of  the  current  supergame,  while  in  the  Cost  treatment  that  same  information  is  only 
available at a cost of 2 points per period paid by the investor in advance. Similar to subsection 5.1, we 
start with a within-subject analysis and then move to a between-subject analysis. 
       Notice first that, consistent with Finding 1 for the No_Min and Min_No sessions, the frequencies of 
trust and reciprocity in the No treatment are all greater than zero, but the social norm of complete trust and 
reciprocity is not supported in that the aggregate frequency of Invest-and-Return remains low, averaging   22 
again around one-third over all sessions. 
Comparing the impact of providing free and full information on trustees –the Info treatment-- with 
the No information treatment, we have the following: 
 
Finding 4:  The free provision of a longer history of information to investors on the past behavior of their 
matched trustee (Info) leads to a significant increase in trust and reciprocity relative to the No treatment. 
 
Support for Finding 4 is found using the 6 session-level differences in the frequencies of Invest, Return-
given-Invest  and  Invest-and-Return  between  the  No  and  Info  treatments  (one-tailed  Wilcoxon  signed 
ranks test, p<0.05 for all three tests).  
Consider  next  the  Cost  treatment  where  investors  are  provided  with  the  possibility  to  purchase 
information at a cost of 2 points per period.  Consistent with Finding 4, the frequencies of trust and 
reciprocity in the Cost treatment remain significantly greater than when no information is available (one-
tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p<0.05 for all three tests, 6 session level obs.). Furthermore, we also 
have the following (one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, 6 session level obs. at the 10% significance 
level): 
 
Finding  5:  The  frequencies  of  Invest  (trust)  and  Invest-and-Return  (trust  and  reciprocity)  are  not 
significantly  different  in  the  Info treatment  and  Cost  treatment.  The  frequency  of  Return-given-Invest 
(reciprocity) is marginally significantly higher in the Info treatment than in the Cost treatment.  
 
Finding 5 provides mixed support for Proposition 3. On the one hand, trustees seem to recognize that 
when information is costly not all investors will purchase it and consequently they do not play Return as 
often as in the Info treatment. On the other hand, according to Proposition 3, investors should invest less 
frequently in the Cost treatment than in the Info treatment but in the data there is no significant difference 
in these investment frequencies. Finding 5 suggests that trustees’ behavior may be more sensitive to the 
change in information treatment than investors’ behavior, an observation that is consistent with earlier 
findings  from  the  No_Min  and  Min_No  sessions.  Another  explanation  for  the  non-significance  in 
investors’ trusting behavior between the Info and the Cost treatment is that the difference in the frequency 
of reciprocity between these two treatments is not large enough to change the investor’s best response. 
Indeed, when the average return rate is above around 77%, the investor’s best response is Invest.  We find 
that the frequency of return-given-invest exceeds 77% in all sessions of both the Info and Cost treatments 
with the exception of one session of the Cost treatment. 
In our design, there is no information available in the first period of a supergame (―sequence‖) in any 
treatment, so an alternative way to examine the treatment effect is to compare the frequencies of trust and   23 
reciprocity excluding the first periods. We can confirm that Findings 4-5 continue to hold when the first 
periods are excluded from the data analysis -- the frequencies of Invest, Return-given-Invest, and Invest-
and-Return excluding the first periods are reported in Appendix C. 
Although the frequencies of trust and reciprocity are significantly increased when information is 
freely provided or available for purchase, one may wonder whether efficiency is enhanced by information 
provision, especially in the case where information is costly.  The final two rows of Table 4 present the 
average  per  period  payoff  in  points  that  subjects  earned  under  each  treatment  (taking  into  account 
information purchase costs, if any).   
 
Finding 6: Players’ average payoffs are significantly increased when full information is freely provided or 
available for purchase compared with the case where information is not available. 
 
Support for Finding 6 comes from analysis of the 6 session-level observations we have on payoffs in the 
No information treatment versus either the Cost or Info treatments (one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, 
p<0.05 for both tests). 
As  before,  we  can  treat  the  first  treatment  in  these  6  sessions  as  independent  observations.  
Consistent with Finding 4, we find that providing full information in the first treatment (Info) significantly 
increases the frequencies of Invest, Return-given-Invest, and Invest-and-Return  relative to the case where 
no information is provided in the first treatment (No) (one-sided Robust Rank-Order test, p<0.05). The 
same result holds if we compare the case where no information or full information is provided in the 
second treatment of each session; that is, experience is not the driving factor. This evidence again shows 
that the amount of information provided about trustees matters for enhancing trust and reciprocity.   
We look for order effects by examining the third, Cost treatment of all 6 sessions.  We find that none 
of  the  frequencies  of  Invest,  Return-given-Invest  and  Invest-and-Return  in  the  Cost  treatment  are 
significantly different across the 6 sessions.  This finding implies that there is no significant order effect, 
that is, whether the subjects experience the No treatment or the Info treatment first and then switch to the 
other treatment does not significantly affect their behavior in the third and final Cost treatment. Finally, we 
also check whether subjects’ behavior in the No treatment and Info treatment is different when the same 
treatment is the first or the second treatment in the session.  We find that there is no significant difference 
for all the cases except that the frequency of Invest in the No treatment is marginally significantly higher 
when the No treatment is the first treatment than when it is the second treatment (Robust Rank-Order test, 
p<0.1). 
17 
                                            
17 These conclusions regarding order effects should be treated with some caution. Table 4 reveals a non-trivial difference in the average frequency 
of invest-and-return in the Cost treatment when the session starts with the No treatment as compared with when the session starts with the Info 
treatment. Indeed, a regression analysis (Table 9 below) reveals a significant order effect for this frequency in the Cost treatment. Thus, the 
insignificant non-parametric test for order effects may be due to the small number of independent observations (three per treatment order).   24 
Finally, we also examined whether the frequencies of Invest, Return-given-Invest and Invest-and-
Return are greater under free, full information as compared with the free, minimal information used in our 
first set of experiments.  In the case where free information (minimal or full) was provided in the first 
treatment of a session, we find that the frequencies of Invest, Return-given-Invest, and Invest-and-Return 
are all significantly higher in the case of full information (one-sided Robust Rank-Order test, p<0.05 for 
all three tests). However, when free full or free minimal information are the second treatment of a session, 
following a first treatment of no information, the same three frequencies are not significantly different 
from one another (one-sided Robust Rank-Order test, p>0.1 for all three tests).  Summarizing, we have: 
 
Finding  7:  The  frequencies  of  Invest,  Invest-given-Return  and  Invest-and-Return  under  free  and  full 
information are greater than or equal to those observed under minimal information, depending on the 
treatment order.  
       
        Summarizing the results of the paper to this point, we have several important findings.  First, absent 
reputational information on the prior behavior of trustees, a social norm of complete trust and reciprocity 
is not achieved despite the theoretical possibility under the contagious equilibrium.  Second, whether the 
game  has  a  finite  horizon  or  indefinite  horizon  does  not  affect  significantly  the  level  of  trust  and 
reciprocity under no information. Third, providing minimal information on trustee’s prior behavior has 
some effect on Invest, Return-given-Invest and Invest-and-Return relative to the case of no information, 
but this effect depends on whether minimal information comes after a period of no information. Fourth, 
providing a longer history on trustees’ prior behavior has a larger and more consistent effect on trust and 
reciprocity than minimal information on trustees’ prior-period choices compared to the benchmark of no 
information.  The  effect  of  the  longer  history  of  information  is  robust  regardless  of  whether  that 
information is provided before or after the No treatment, according to both a within-subjects and between-
subjects analysis of session-level data.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, making full information 
available at a small cost yields outcomes that are similar to those observed when full information is 
provided automatically and without cost.    
 
5.4  Heterogeneous Behavior in the No Information Treatments 
 
        Our aggregate results indicate that when no reputational information is available, the frequency of 
Invest-and-Return (trust and reciprocity) in the indefinitely repeated game is about 33%, far below an 
equilibrium possibility of complete trust and reciprocity as supported by the contagious strategy.  In this 
section we look more deeply into the data for evidence of heterogeneity in play of the trust game both at 
the supergame level and at the individual level.   25 
We first ask whether the low overall frequency of trust and reciprocity in the indefinitely repeated 
game without information feedback is uniform across supergames or whether there is heterogeneity across 
supergames in the frequencies of invest-and-return.  Figure 3 shows the distribution of supergames over 
10  different  frequencies  of  invest-and-return  (horizontal  axis),  using  data  from  the  no  information 
treatment in the ―No_Min‖ and ―No_Info_Cost‖ sessions where the no information treatment was first and 
so can be regarded as being independent of contamination from other treatments (same data source for 
Figure 4). The numbers above each bar in Figure 3 represents the average period length (duration) of all 
supergames  in  that  frequency  bin.  We  observe  that  supergames  with  Invest-and-Return  frequencies 
between 30-40% are the most frequently observed arising in 25% of all supergames, however, both higher 
(e.g. 60-70%) and lower (e.g. 10-20%) frequencies of Invest-and-Return also have some mass in the 
distribution.  We conclude that the distribution of the frequency of Invest-and-Return is widely dispersed, 
as opposed to being concentrated at the extremes (for example, 2/3 of supergames having frequencies of 
Invest-and-Return  of  0%  while  the  remaining  1/3  having  frequencies  of  Invest-and-Return  of  100%, 
which would be consistent with the contagious equilibrium being played in some of the supergames and 
the no trust equilibrium being played in the other supergames).  We note that, more generally, many 
equilibria are possible in the indefinitely repeated trust game that we study, not just the extreme outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Supergames by Frequencies of Invest-and-Return 
(All Supergames in No Treatment of No_Min and No_Info_Cost Sessions) 
 
        Figure 4 reports the average frequency of Invest-and-Return in each of the first five periods of all 
supergames  that  had  five  or  more  periods  in  the  No  information  treatment  of  all  No_Min  and 
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of the No information treatment because we wanted to allow enough periods for evidence of a contagious 
pattern to emerge and 5 periods is also the expected duration of a supergame. We observe that the average 
frequency of Invest-and-Return in the first period of these supergames is 48.7%.  Given that this average 
is  less  than  100%,  the  contagious  strategy  predicts  that  average  frequencies  of  Invest-and-Return  in 
subsequent  periods  2,  3,  4  and  5  should  be  monotonically  decreasing.  Figure  4  reveals  a  slight  but 
statistically insignificant (p=.30) negative and clearly non-monotonic trend in these average frequencies 
over the first five periods. This provides further evidence against the notion that subjects were employing 
the contagious strategy in these supergames. 
 
 
Figure 4: Frequency of Invest-and-Return by Period of Supergame  
(All Supergames with 5 or more periods in No Treatment of No_Min and No_Info_Cost Sessions) 
 
        We  next look  for  evidence  of  individual  heterogeneity  by  examining  whether  and  how personal 
histories may have played a role in subjects’ decisions to invest and to return conditional on investment.  
For this analysis we use session-level averages from all No Information, indefinite horizon treatments (all 
14 sessions). Following the logic of the contagious strategy, let us label each subject in each period of 
each supergame as a ―c-type‖ or a ―d-type‖ player according to his or her history of play so far in that 
supergame. Recall that d-type players are those whose history includes a defection either by themselves or 
by any of their randomly assigned partners. Otherwise, players are defined as c-type players. We further 
divide all the c-type players into c1-type players, who are automatically defined as c-type in the first 
period, and c2-type players, who have not yet experienced defection in later periods of the supergame.  
Similarly, we divide all the d-types into d1-types, who initiate a defection, and d2-types who become d-
types by experiencing a defection by another player. 
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Trustees respectively, based on 14 session-level averages from all NO information treatment sessions. 
Using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test on the session average frequencies (14 obs. per test), we find that the 
frequencies of Invest or of Return-given-Invest vary significantly across the different player types in all 
but one pairwise comparisons (p<.05).
18  Table 5 also reports the average frequency of the various player 
types. We see that in 61% of all periods, Investors can be classified as d-types while in 51% of all periods, 
Trustees can be classified as d-types; this amounts to a substantial departure from the equilibrium path that 
supports  complete  (100%)  trust  and  reciprocity.   Notice  however,  that  when  subjects  are  on  the 
equilibrium path (when players can be classified as c-types), the frequency of invest and the frequency of 
return-given-invest are high, averaging in excess of 75 %.  The departure from 100% invest or retu rn-
given-invest among c-types appears mainly due to the behavior of c1-types who choose Invest or Return-
given-Invest less than 68% of the time; c2-types, who have neither experienced nor initiated a defection, 
are investing or returning above 95% of the time. Among d-types, subjects who initiate a defection (d1-
types) consistently continue to defect, but surprisingly, subjects who  experience another’s defection first 
(d2-types) continue to choose to invest or to return given investment with a rather high frequency: 42% for 
investors and 67% for trustees. We summarize these findings as in Finding 8. 
 
Player Type 









Frequency of  Types 
(All Periods) 
C type  0.818  39%  0.788  49%  14 
  --C1 type  0.676        --20%  0.651        --27%  14 
  --C2 type  0.970        --19%  0.955        --22%  14 
D type  0.309  61%  0.564  51%  14 
  --D1 type  0.200        --31%  0.358         --17%  14 
  --D2 type  0.417        --30%  0.667         --34%  14 
Table 5: Behavior Conditional on Personal Histories/Types (All No Info Treatment Data) 
         
Finding 8  Behavior differs according to whether subjects are classified as c- or d-types. However, there 
are substantial departures from the contagious strategy supporting an equilibrium of complete trust and 
reciprocity in the No Information treatment.  On the equilibrium path (when subjects can be classified as 
c-types) subjects initiate a defection in the first period more than 30% of the time.  Off the equilibrium 
path  (when  subjects  can  be  classified  as  d-types)  they  do  not  consistently  punish  as  the  contagious 
strategy requires. 
 
5.5 Use of Information in the Treatments with Information 
 
                                            
18 The exception is that the difference in the frequency of return-given-invest by c1- and d2-types is only marginally significant p=0.09.    28 
This  subsection  focuses  on  how  investors’  behavior  varied  with  the  information  they  had  about 
trustees’ past decisions in the Min, Info and Cost treatments. We first analyze the effect of no versus 
minimal  information.  We  then  examine  the  effect  of  minimal  versus  full  information  before  finally 
comparing the case of free versus costly full information. 
 
5.5.1 Minimal Information versus No Information 
 
Figure 5: Frequency of Invest Conditional on Trustee’s Prior-Period Choice 
 
Figure 5 presents the frequency of Invest conditional on the prior-period choice of the investor’s 
current matched trustee (i.e., Keep or Return) in the No and Min treatments of the No_Min and the 
Min_No sessions, respectively.  In the No information treatment, there is no significant difference in these 
conditional frequencies of Invest (Wilcoxon signed ranks test on 8 session-level observations p>0.1); 
while Figure 5 suggests there is a difference, this is owing to investment being higher in sessions where 
the return rate is also higher, but within the same sessions the difference is not significant. By contrast, in 
the  Min  information  treatment,  the  frequency  of  Invest  is  significantly  higher  when  the  prior  period 
behavior of the trustee is Return than when it is Keep (regardless of the treatment order – one-sided 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test p<.10 for both Min treatments, 4 observations each). 
 
Finding 9:  The frequency of Invest is significantly higher when the matched trustee’s prior-period choice 
is “Return” than when it is “Keep” in the Min treatment but not in the No treatment. 
         
Finding 9 has to be treated with some caution as the prior behavior of trustees is not an experimental 
manipulation and may well represent an endogenous response to the prior trust exhibited by investors. 
Indeed,  in  the  No  information  treatment  we  observe  higher  frequencies  of  Invest  when  the  current 
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difference is not statistically significant. Relatedly, Figure 5 also suggests that investors’ behavior is not 
100% dependent on the minimal information they receive about trustees’ prior period behavior.  Indeed, 
we observe that investors still invest with a positive probability even if the minimal information shows 
that their current partner defected (kept) in the prior period, and symmetrically, investors do not always 
invest when their partner is revealed to have cooperated (returned) in the prior period.  
 
5.5.2  Minimal Information versus Information 
 
Figure 6: Frequency of Invest Conditional on Trustee’s History 
 
In the case of free information on the full histories of trustees’ behavior, Proposition 2 states that 
there exists an equilibrium in which the trustee continues to play the contagious strategy but investors play 
a strategy that is conditional on the information revealed about the trustee.  In particular, complete trust 
and reciprocity is an equilibrium possibility in this information environment.  In Figure 6 we compare the 
conditional frequency of Invest decisions by investors in the Min Info treatment with that in the Info 
treatment. For the Min treatment, the conditional frequency is based on whether the investor’s currently 
matched trustee was revealed to have kept or returned in the prior period.  For the Info treatment, the 
conditional frequency is based on whether the investor’s currently matched trustee was revealed to have 
always kept (All Keep) or always returned (All Return) in all prior periods of the current supergame. 
Figure 6 provides support for the following: 
 
Finding  10:  The  frequency  of  Invest,  conditional  on  a  history  of  “All  Return”  (Info  treatment)  is 
significantly greater than the frequency of Invest conditional on a prior period history of “Return” (Min 
treatment). There is no significant difference in the frequency of Invest conditional on a history of “All 
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Finding 10 is based on the results of a robust rank order test using 14 session-level observations, 
? ≤ .05.    Based  on  Proposition  2  (and  Corollary  1),  we  would  expect  a  high  frequency  of  return 
conditional on a prior history of Return in the Info treatment but not in the Min treatment.  While the very 
high frequency of return conditional on investment in the Info treatment is consistent with this prediction, 
the lower but still high frequency of return in the Min treatment is not. We note further that while there is a 
significant difference in the conditional frequencies of Invest between these two treatments, the difference 
is not very large.   
  




Figure 7: Frequencies of Invest Conditional on Trustee’s Aggregate Ratio of Return 
 
Figure 7 shows the frequency of Invest conditional on the matched trustee’s Ratio of Return in the 
current supergame for the (free) Info and Cost treatment-when information was purchased (top panel) and 
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as well as the trustee’s history of play in the 10 most recent periods, was revealed to investors in the Info 
treatment and was available for purchase in the Cost treatment.  Here we compare the frequency of Invest 
in these two treatments when the trustee’s Ratio of Return is allocated into 5 non-overlapping bins for the 
Ratio of Return.  Figure 7 provides support for the following finding: 
 
Finding 11:  When investors have information on trustees, frequencies of Invest are generally increasing 
in the Ratio of Return by the matched trustee.  
 
We further observe from the top panel of Figure 7 that investors purchasing information do not choose 
Invest with a high frequency unless the trustee’s Ratio of Return is also very high (0.8-1), which is likely 
owing to the cost these investors had to pay for information about their trustee. 
How does behavior in the Cost treatment compare with the equilibrium prediction of Proposition 3?  
Table 6 provides some answers.
19  First, the most efficient equilibrium— the benchmark we use in our 
analysis of the data— has ? = 1, i.e., investors who do not purchase information choose Invest 100% of 
the time. As Table 6 reveals, this prediction comes close to holding true in 4 of our 6 sessions.  
 
Session 
% of Invest conditional on   
No Information Purchase 
% of Information 
Purchase 
% of Return given 
Invest 
Data  Equil. pred.  Data  Equil. pred.  Data  Equil. pred. 
No_Info_Cost1  1.000  1  0.226  0.563  0.992  0.943 
No_Info_Cost2  0.907  1  0.368  0.563  0.775  0.943 
No_Info_Cost3  0.882  1  0.261  0.563  0.889  0.943 
Info_No_Cost1  0.905  1  0.013  0.563  0.989  0.943 
Info_No_Cost2  0.164  1  0.247  0.563  0.838  0.943 
Info_No_Cost3  0.407  1  0.333  0.563  0.625  0.943 
Averages  0.725  1  0.245  0.563  0.877  0.943 
Table 6: Comparison with Equilibrium Prediction for Cost Treatment 
 
Conditional on  ? = 1, the efficient equilibrium prediction calls for investors to purchase information 
on  trustees  56.3%  of  the  time.  As  Table  5  reveals,  the  actual  frequency  of  information  purchase  by 
investors is significantly lower, averaging 24.49% (t-test p<.01).
20  Combined with the finding that the 
frequency of trust and reciprocity is not significantly different between the  Info and Cost treatment, we 
conclude that the mere availability of information creates a large positive externality for investors. While 
the overall frequency of Invest in the Cost treatment is 65.55% when information is purchased, as Table 6 
                                            
19  All analysis here excludes the first period of each supergame, where information is not available to purchase. 
20  In our experimental design, trustees were not informed ex-post as to whether or not their matched investor had purchased information about 
their (the trustee’s) history of play, as such choices are usually private information in real-world settings. However, this design choice may have 
led investors to purchase information less frequently than in the mixed strategy equilibrium of the theory.      32 
reveals this frequency averages 72.48% when information is not purchased. Finally, we note that despite 
the lower-than-predicted frequency of information purchase by investors, trustees are nevertheless playing 
Return with high frequency in the Cost treatment. In fact we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
frequency of return given investment is not different from the efficient equilibrium prediction of 94.3% (t-
test p>.10). 
In Table 7 we take a closer look at which subjects bought information and how often they bought 
information. Table 7 shows the frequency of information purchase for each of the six subjects when that 
subject was assigned the role of investor in the Cost treatment.  The frequencies over 0.5 are shown in 
bold face.  
Notice that 9/36=1/4 of subjects purchased information more than 50% of the time (9 entries are in 
boldface). Approximately 1/2 of subjects (17/36) never chose to buy information.  One subject was never 
assigned as an investor in the Cost treatment.  The remaining 1/4 of subjects bought information at least 
once, but less than 50% of the time. 
 
Session  Subject 1  Subject 2  Subject 3  Subject 4  Subject 5  Subject 6 
No_Info_Cost1  0/14  0/9  0/7  21/21  0/18  0/24 
No_Info_Cost2  4/27  2/2  5/24  2/6  19/26  0/2 
No_Info_Cost3  0/8  2/20  11/11  3/5  2/2  0/23 
Info_No_Cost1  0/23  N/A  0/4  0/23  1/9  0/16 
Info_No_Cost2  0/19  0/14  0/19  4/12  1/1  15/16 
Info_No_Cost3  1/7  5/20  1/3  0/7  20/20  0/24 
Table 7: The Frequency of Information Purchase for Each Subject 
 
We summarize these results as follows: 
 
Finding 12: In the Cost treatment, there is heterogeneity in the frequency with which subjects purchase 
information,  with  some  investors  never  purchasing  information,  while  others  frequently  purchasing 
information. On average, the frequency with which investors purchase information is less than half of the 
predicted  level  in  the  most  efficient  equilibrium.  Nevertheless,  the  frequency  with  which  uninformed 
investors play Invest and the frequency with which trustees play Return-given-Invest are both high, and 
close to the efficient equilibrium predictions. 
 
5.6  Investor Strategies 
   33 
        In this section we explore the types of strategies that were adopted by investors in making investment 
decisions in the three sets of experiments.  Our method is to use a random-effects Probit regression model 
on pooled data from all sessions of a treatment, where the standard errors have been adjusted to allow for 
clustering of observations by session number.
21  In all specifications of this model, we always include 
several variables that  capture fixed effects (s equence,  period,  order).  Here,  ―sequence‖  refers  to  the 
supergame number and ―period’’ to the period number in a sequence. ―Order‖ is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the session begins with minimal or full information and equals 0 otherwise.  Following Camera 
and Casari (2009), we also introduce a set of regressors (dummy variables) that are used to trace out 
investor’s strategies. In particular, we include a ―grim trigger‖ dummy that equals 1 in all periods of a 
supergame following the first period of that supergame in which the investor experienced a defection by a 
trustee and equals 0 otherwise. We also include two ―tit-for-tat‖ dummies that equal 1 in the first and 
second period respectively following a defection and equal 0 otherwise. Third, we include dummies that 
represent the information shown to the investor regarding to the current paired trustee’s past behavior in 
the current sequence (Last return, All return, and All no return). ―Last return‖ is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if information reveals that the current paired trustee returned last period. ―All return‖ has a 
value of 1 if information reveals that the trustee returned every time the investor invested, and ―All no 
return‖ has a value of 1 if information reveals that the trustee never returned given investment. We also 
consider some interactive dummy variables that are the product of dummy variables, e.g., Grim and Last 
return.  Finally, Buy and All return, Buy and All no return, Buy and Last return are dummy variables that 
are relevant to the Cost treatment only and are conditional on the investor having bought information. 
 
Table 8: Random-Effect Probit Regression on Individual Choice to Invest  
(For No_Min and Min_No and Finite Horizon Sessions) 
Dependent variable: 







Constant  .994 (.217)***  1.18 (.316)***  -.548 (.541) 
Period  -.020 (.012)*  -.144 (.078)*  -.009 (.018) 
Sequence  .021 (.041)  .007 (.0359)  .038 (.030) 
Order  -.366 (.347)    -.289 (.318) 
Grim trigger  -1.188 (.335)***  -.978 (.287)***  -.765 (.391)** 
Tit-for-tat with lag 1  -.050 (.225)  -.329 (.293)  -.305 (.246) 
Tit-for-tat with lag 2  -.130 (0.233)  -.269 (.293)  -.229 (.191) 
Last return      2.254 (.207)*** 
Grim and Last return      -1.102 (.498)** 
Observations  720  384  747 
 
The Probit Regression results in Table 8 are for the No_Min, Min_No and No-Finite experimental 
                                            
21  For this estimation we used the gllamm package in Stata version 11.   34 
sessions  and  reveal  several  important  findings.  First,  a  case  might  be  made  that  subjects  in  the  No 
treatment were playing in accord with the predictions of the contagious strategy, as evidenced by the 
significance of the negative coefficient associated with the grim trigger dummy and insignificance of all 
other right hand side variables (other than the constant term).  However, we see that the grim trigger 
dummy is also significant in the No-finite treatment, which suggests that subjects who employed such a 
strategy are not conditioning on whether the horizon is indefinite or finite.  By contrast, in the Min 
treatment, subjects were playing according to a mixture of motives, as indicated by the positive and 
significant coefficient on the last return dummy variable and the negative and significant coefficients on 
the grim and grim-and-last-return dummy variables.  
Similar findings emerge from the probit regressions conducted using the third set of experimental 
sessions, the No_Info_Cost and Info_No_Cost data as revealed in Table 9.  In particular, we see that 
investors in the No treatment continued playing a grim-type strategy, with tit-for-tat also showing up 
significantly.  Investors in the Info and Cost treatments were more likely to choose Invest if the trustees’ 
history they had bought showed they had always returned or returned in the last period and were less 
likely to choose Invest otherwise.  By contrast with the Min treatment, in the Info treatment, we observe 
that the coefficient on the grim-and-last-return interaction dummy is positive; when more information is 
available, it appears that investors rely less on the global, grim punishment strategy in favor of a more 
local, individual information-contingent strategy.   
 
Table 9: Random-Effect Probit Regression on Individual Choice to Invest  
(For No_Info_Cost and Info_No_Cost Sessions) 
Dependent variable: 







Constant  .761 (.477)  .588 (.853)  3.903 (2.887) 
Period  -.002 (.054)  -.011 (.007)  -.102 (.043)** 
Sequence  .030 (.038)  .036 (.069)  -.075 (.129) 
Order  -.465 (.370)  -.307 (.515)  -1.338 (.561)** 
Grim trigger  -1.227 (.382)***  -1.549 (.210)***  -1.120 (.670)* 
Tit-for-tat with lag 1  -.973 (.111)***  -1.088 (.622)*  -.467 (.267)* 
Tit-for-tat with lag 2  -.419 (.289)  -.515 (.488)  .199 (.463) 
All return    .468 (.229)**   
All no return    -1.350 (.449)***   
Last return    .935 (.409)**   
Grim and Last return    1.127 (.337)***   
Buy and All return      1.325 (.605)** 
Buy and All no return      -1.341 (1.035) 
Buy and Last return      .838 (.428)* 
Grim and Buy and Last return      .119 (.305) 
Observations  552  528  486 
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We summarize these results as: 
 
Finding 13:  When investors lack information on trustees they behave in a manner that resembles the 
contagious strategy, investing less frequently when their history has included a defection (play of Keep by 
the  trustee)  than  when  it has  not.  When  investors  have  information  on  trustees,  they  condition  their 
behavior on this information. With longer histories of information, the importance of the contagious-grim 
strategy in sustaining trust is diminished in favor of a conditionally trustworthy strategy where investors 




We have studied the development of a social norm of trust and reciprocity among strangers in an 
indefinitely repeated trust game with random matching. By contrast with the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, 
the  trust  game  captures  the  one-sided  incentive  problem  that  arises  in  many  everyday  economic 
transactions. Indeed, the main focus of most reputation systems is on the behavior of trustees (second 
movers). The baseline treatment involves no information on trustees’ (second mover) behavior but the 
environment is one that can support complete trust and reciprocity as an equilibrium of the indefinitely 
repeated game. Other treatments involve the amount of information provided on a trustee’s prior history of 
play.  A further treatment concerns whether information provision is free or costly. We also examine the 
role of the indefiniteness of horizon in supporting the contagious equilibrium. We have provided a simple 
theoretical model examining these various informational assumptions and have examined the predictions 
that follow from our model in a controlled laboratory experiment. 
Although the parameters of the game were chosen to support a social norm of complete (100%) trust 
and reciprocity as an equilibrium of the baseline indefinitely repeated game with no information about 
trustees, we find that the frequency of trust and reciprocity averages only about 33% in this case. A similar 
finding obtains in the finitely repeated games under no information about trustees. Providing reputational 
information about trustees leads to an increase in the frequencies of trust and reciprocity over the baseline 
No information case; the difference in the frequency of trust and reciprocity becomes significantly greater 
as the length of the history of the prior behavior of trustees is increased. Most importantly, providing the 
possibility to purchase information at a small cost also significantly increases the frequencies of trust and 
reciprocity compared with the baseline case where such information is not available. The latter result 
suggests that it may be the availability of information that matters even more than the actual content of 
that information. After all, only 24% of investors in our Cost treatment purchased information, and most 
who did not purchase information chose Invest anyway.   
Our findings help us to comprehend the emergence and prevalence of reputation systems in economic   36 
interactions involving ―strangers‖ and one-sided incentive problems such as the online feedback system 
found on eBay or credit reports provided by credit bureaus. The significant contribution of this paper is 
that  we  have  identified  the  importance  of  individual,  reputational  information  over  community-wide 
enforcement  in  increasing  and  sustaining  trust  and  reciprocity  and  improving  efficiency.    This 
understanding is of obvious importance to the design and operation of economic institutions. 
For future research, we are interested in designing and comparing different reputational mechanisms 
that  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  markets  with  random  and  anonymous  players.  For  instance,  one 
comparison is between an online, peer-to-peer feedback system (where information need not be truthful) 
and a third party credit bureau (where information may be presumed to be more truthful). Online feedback 
systems  involve  decentralized  voluntary  contribution  of  information  about  transactions  with  free 
dissemination  to  other  users.  On  the  contrary,  the  traditional  credit  bureau  collects  information  in  a 
centralized and mandatory method, as in our Min and Info treatments and charges users for access to this 
information. Although we have shown in this paper that providing reputational information significantly 
increases efficiency, we still have not solved the more practical issue of how to decentralize or finance the 
reputational system.  We leave such an analysis to future research. 
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Appendix A: Definition of  ) ( f  and  ) ( g  and Proof of Propositions 2 and 3 
 
Definition of  ) ( f  and  ) ( g : To provide a formal definition of  ) ( f  and  ) ( g , further notation is 
necessary. Let  t X  be the total number of d-type investors and let  t Y  be the total number of d-type trustees 
at the  beginning  of period t . The  state  of  the  world  in  period t ,  t Z ,  contains  information  about the 
number of d-type investors and d-type trustees in the current period and is defined as a one-to-one and 
onto function from  ) , ( t t Y X  to the set of natural numbers  )} 2 ( , , 2 , 1 {  n n  : 
. 0 ) 1 (      t t t t t Y X for Y X n Z  
Let  A be an  ) 2 ( ) 2 (    n n n n  transition matrix when all players follow the contagious strategy. It has 
elements  
i Z j Z a t t ij     | Pr{ 1  and all players follow the contagious strategy}. 
For  example,   )} 1 , 0 ( ) , ( | ) 2 , 0 ( ) , Pr{( } 1 | 2 Pr{ 1 1 1 12          t t t t t t Y X Y X Z Z a  denotes  the 
probability that there are two d-type trustees and no d-type investors in next period given that there is one 
d-type trustee and no d-type investors in the current period. Similarly, let B  be an  ) 2 ( ) 2 (    n n n n
transition matrix when the d-type trustee in consideration deviates from the contagious strategy while all 
other players continue to follow the contagious strategy, with elements  
i Z j Z b t t ij     | Pr{ 1 , one d-type trustee deviates from the contagious strategy  
and all other players follow the contagious strategy}. 
Thus,  matrix  A B  characterizes  how  the  diffusion  of  d-type  players  is  delayed if one  d-type  trustee 
unilaterally deviates from the contagious strategy.  Define   as an  1 ) 1 (   n n  column vector with 𝑖th 
element equal to the conditional probability that the d-type trustee meets a c-type investor when the state 
is i  in period t . Finally, let  i e  be a  ) 2 ( 1   n n  row vector with the 𝑖th element equal to 1 and all other 
elements equal to 0. 
Define   and     
1
2 ) )( ( ) (

    A I A B e g n . 
) ( f  is the increase in the sum of the expected probability (and also the expected payoff) of meeting 
a c-type investor for the d-type trustee in all the future periods when this d-type trustee chooses to deviate 
1
1 ( ) ( )( ) f e B A I A    
     40 
from defection (i.e. continues to return) given that the d-type trustee is the only d-type player in the 
community. Similarly,  ) ( g  is  the increase in  the  sum  of  the  expected  payoff  (and  the  probability of 
meeting  a  c-type  investor)  in  future  periods  for  the d-type  trustee  from  slowing  down  the  contagious 
process given that currently there is just one d-type trustee and one d-type investor.
22 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider the following strategy: the trustee chooses Keep if he is a d-type and 
chooses Return if he is a c-type; the investor chooses Invest in the first period and in subsequent periods if 
the information reveals the current trustee to be a c-type and chooses No Invest if the information reveals 
the current trustee to be a d-type. 
We show next that a one-shot deviation is not profitable for the investor or the trustee both on the 
equilibrium path and off the equilibrium path. 
        For the trustee on the equilibrium path, the payoff from following the strategy above is  
1−?
1−? , while 
the payoff from a deviation is 1, with no payoff in all future periods. So the trustee has no incentive to 
deviate if ? ≥ ?.  
        For the trustee off the equilibrium path, the payoff from following the strategy is 1, the payoff while 
the payoff from a deviation is 1 − ?, so the trustee has no incentive to deviate. 
        For the investor on the equilibrium path (when the information reveals the current trustee to be a c-
type), the payoff from following the strategy is ? + 𝐸𝜋1, and the payoff from deviation is ? + 𝐸𝜋2, where 
𝐸𝜋1  and 𝐸𝜋2  are the future payoffs given that the investor chooses Invest and No Invest in the current 
period respectively. If the investor chooses No Invest instead of Invest this period, the current matched 
trustee will become a d-type instead of remaining a c-type player, so the investor’s future payoff given No 
Invest in the current period, 𝐸𝜋2, is smaller than the future payoff given Invest in the current period, 𝐸𝜋1. 
Therefore the investor has no incentive to deviate on the equilibrium path. 
        For the investor off the equilibrium path (when the information reveals the current trustee to be a d-
type), the payoff from following the strategy is ? + 𝐸𝜋3, and the payoff from deviation is 𝐸𝜋4, where 𝐸𝜋3 
and 𝐸𝜋4 are the investor’s future payoffs given No Invest and Invest in the current period respectively. 
Since the current trustee is a d-type, the investor’s choice in the current period will not affect the number 
of d-type trustees in the future. Thus, 𝐸𝜋3 equals 𝐸𝜋4 and the investor has no incentive to deviate. 
 
Proof  of  Corollary  1:  We  will  show  that  the  following  strategy  under  minimal  information  is  an 
equilibrium strategy, but only for the knife-edge condition where ? = ?. Specifically, the trustee chooses 
Keep if he is a d-type and chooses Return if he is a c-type; the investor chooses Invest in the first period or 
if the minimal information reveals the current trustee returned last period (is a c-type) and chooses No 
Invest otherwise. 
                                            
22 The formal derivation of ?(?) and ?(?), as well as the formula for each element of matrix A and B can be found in Xie and Lee (2011).   41 
It  is  easy  to  verify  that  the  investor  will  follow  the  proposed  strategy  (similar  to  the  proof  of 
Proposition 1).  In particular, consider the incentive constraint for a d-type trustee given investment by the 
investor in the current period. The d-type trustee’s payoff from choosing Keep in the current period is 1. 
However, by choosing Return in the current period and waiting to play Keep in the next period, his payoff 
is  1 − ? + ? since the investor in the next period will choose Invest given the trustee’s record of Return in 
the current period.  Therefore a d-type trustee will not deviate from playing Keep only if ? ≥ ?. 
Next, consider the incentive constraint for a c-type trustee given investment by the investor in the 
current period.  His payoff from choosing Return is 
1−?
1−? and his payoff from choosing Keep is 1. So he 
will not deviate from playing Return only if ? ≥ ?. 
Therefore under minimal information, the proposed strategy is an equilibrium strategy only if ? = ?. 
Intuitively, in the minimal information case, once a trustee gets investment for the current period, for the 
future history, the past history is irrelevant and hence trustees carrying different minimum information will 
face the same incentives. Different types might behave differently only in the knife-edge case where they 
are both indifferent between remaining true to their type and switching to the other type. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Consider  the  following  strategies:  In  the  first  period,  the  investor  always  chooses  Invest.  In 
subsequent  periods,  the  investor  purchases  information  with  probability ?.  If  he  does  not  purchase 
information,  he  chooses  Invest  with  probability ?,  where 0 ≤ ? ≤ 1,  otherwise  if  the  information 
purchased reveals the trustee has always played Return, the investor plays Invest and otherwise he plays 
No Invest. Trustees adopt an asymmetric strategy, with a fraction ? of trustees choosing Return given 
investment in every period, and fraction 1 − ? of trustees choosing Keep given investment in every period. 
        The trustee’s payoff from choosing Return every period is  1 − ?  +
?
1−?  ? +  1 − ? ? (1 − ?). 
        The trustee’s payoff from choosing Keep every period is 1 +
?
1−? (1 − ?)?. 
        These two payoffs must be equal in the first period, so  
 1 − ?  +
?
1−?  ? +  1 − ? ?  1 − ?  = 1 +
?
1−?  1 − ? ?, 







(? − ?? + ???)2 
       Notice that ? is increasing in ? if ? > ?. Thus, if the investor chooses Invest with a higher probability   42 
when no information is available, in equilibrium the probability for the investor to purchase information 
must be higher. The intuition for this finding is that if the investor increases the probability of invest under 
no  information,  she  must  at  the  same  time  decrease  the  probability  of  no  information,  otherwise  all 
trustees will switch to always choosing Keep  in every period.  
        In order to show that this is an equilibrium strategy, we also need to show that, given investment, the 
trustee will not switch from playing Return to playing Keep or from playing Keep to playing Return in 
every period, i.e., that p is constant. This is easy to verify since once the trustee chooses Keep in one 
period, then the best he can do (under full information) is to continue to choose Keep in every period. 
Therefore, a trustee who chooses Keep in the first period has no incentive to switch to the other strategy in 
later periods. For a trustee who chooses Return in the first period, in every period he is facing the same 
constraint he faced in the first period, so in every period he will be indifferent between always choosing 
Return and always choosing Keep given investment. 
        Next we show that investors have no incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy. Consider first 
the investors who do not purchase information. These investors will follow a mixed strategy only if their 
payoff from Invest is equal to their payoff from No Invest, i.e., if ? = ??. Since investors also randomize 
as to whether or not they will purchase information, the following equation must hold,           
? = ?? = ?? +  1 − ? ? − ?, 
where the last term of the equation is investor’s payoff from purchasing information and ? is the cost of 
purchasing information. 
        Therefore,  in  equilibrium  the  fraction  of  good  trustees  is ? =
?
?,  and  the  cost  of  information  is 
? =
?
? (? − ?). 
In particular, we are interested in two special cases: Investors who do not purchase information  either 
choose Invest with probability zero (i.e., choose No Invest) or they choose  Invest with probability one.                  
 
Case 1: If the investors choose No Invest with probability one when no information is purchased (? = 0), 
it must hold that ? = ?? +  1 − ? ? − ? ≥ ??.  Given the cost ? chosen in the experiment, ? > ?? and 
therefore the investors will choose No Invest in the first period. So in all the subsequent periods, investors 
should choose not to purchase information and No Invest with probability one. Therefore, the equilibrium 
reduces to the most inefficient equilibrium. 
 
Case 2: If the investors choose Invest with probability one when no information is purchased (? = 1), the 
investors purchase information with probability ? =
?
? and it must hold for that  ?? = ?? +  1 − ? ? −
? ≥ ?. So the fraction of trustees who always choose Return given investment is ? =
?−?
? , where ? ≤
?
? (? − ?). From the parameters chosen in the experiment, ? = 9/16 and ? = 33/35.   43 
 
Next we turn to the efficiency comparison.  
(1)  When 0 < ? < 1, according to the equilibrium outcome, the investor’s payoff in each period is ?. 
The trustee’s average payoff in the first period is ? 1 − ?  +  1 − ?  = 1 − ? given that ? = ?/?, 
and the trustee’s average payoff in each subsequent period (denoted by 𝐴𝑈) is 
 𝐴𝑈 = ? ? +  1 − ? ?  1 − ?  +  1 − ? [(1 − ?)?], where  ? +  1 − ? ?  1 − ?  is the expected 
payoff for a trustee who always chooses Return and  (1 − ?)? is the expected payoff for a trustee 
who always chooses Keep. In the equilibrium, ? =
?−??+???
?−??+??? is increasing in ?. It is easy to verify 
that (1 − ?)? is also increasing in ?. Therefore, the most efficient outcome obtains when ? → 1 and 
𝐴𝑈 → 0.52 given ? =
?
? = 7/9. 
(2)  When ? = 1, according to the equilibrium outcome in Case 2, the investor’s payoff in each period is 
?? > ? given ? = 2 as we chose in the experiment. The trustee’s average payoff in the first period is 
? 1 − ?  +  1 − ? , and the trustee’s average payoff in each subsequent period 
 𝐴𝑈 = ? ? +  1 − ? ?  1 − ?  +  1 − ?   1 − ? ?  = 0.54 > 0.52   given ? = 33/35.  Therefore 
the most efficient equilibrium outcome obtains when ? = 1. 
 
Proof of Corollary 2: As noted in the text, when information is costly, there also exists an inefficient 
equilibrium where no investors purchases information or chooses Invest and no trustee chooses Return. It 
is  easy  to  show  that  deviations  from  this  equilibrium  either  on  or  off  the  equilibrium  path  are  not 
profitable for either the trustee or the investor. 
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Not for Publication 
Appendix B: Instructions Used in the Experiment 
 
In this appendix we provide the instructions given to subjects in the Min_No sessions. In italics, we show 




This is an experiment in decision-making. The department of economics has provided funds for this 
research. During the course of this experiment, you will be called upon to make a series of decisions. If 
you follow these instructions carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of 
money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. We ask that you not talk with one 
another for the duration of the experiment. 
Specifics 
The experiment is divided into a series of sequences. A sequence will consist of an indefinite number 
of rounds. At the beginning of each sequence, you will be randomly assigned as a First Mover or a Second 
Mover.  Your role will appear on your computer screen and will not change during the sequence. At the 
beginning of each round you will be randomly paired with another person who is assigned to the other role 
from your own.  That is, if you are a First Mover (Second Mover), in each round you will be randomly 
paired with a Second Mover (First Mover) with all possible pairings being equally likely. 
In each round, you and your paired player will play the game described in the following graph. First, 
the First Mover chooses between A and B. If the First Mover chooses A, the round is over. The First 
Mover receives 35 points and the Second Mover receives 0 points. If the First Mover chooses B, then the 
Second Mover must make a choice between C and D.  If the Second Mover chooses C, then the First 
Mover receives 0 points and the Second Mover receives 100 points. If the Second Mover chooses D, then 
the First Mover receives 45 points and the Second Mover receives 55 points. Following the first round of a 
sequence, the First Mover will be told the decision that his/her paired Second Mover has made in the last 
round, if that player was able to choose between C and D. The First Mover never knows the identity of 
his/her paired Second Mover. 
(Following the first round of a sequence, at the beginning of each round the First Mover will be told 
the past choices that his/her paired Second Mover has made in each of the most recent rounds of the 
current sequence (up to 10 rounds), provided that this Second Mover had a choice to make (the First 
Mover chose B). The First Mover will be also told the total number of times that his/her paired Second 
Mover has chosen C or D in the entire sequence, again conditional on having the opportunity to make a 
choice (First Mover chose B). The First Mover never knows the identity of his/her paired Second Mover.)   45 
 
         
Figure A1: Decisions and Earnings (in Points) 
 
To complete your choice in each round, click on the decision button and then the OK button. The 
Second Movers need to wait for the First Movers to make a choice between A and B before making their 
own choice. Then the Second Mover will be told that the round is over (if the First Mover chooses A), or 
will be asked to make a choice between C and D (if the First Mover chooses B). 
The computer program will record your choice and the choice made by the player paired with you in 
this round. After all players have made their choices, the results of the round will appear on your screen. 
You will be reminded of your own choice and will be shown the choice of your match, as well as the 
payoff you have earned for the round. Record the results of the round on your RECORD SHEET under the 
appropriate headings. 
Immediately after you have received information on your choice and the choice of the player with 
whom you are randomly paired for the round, a ten-sided die with numbers from 0 to 9 on the sides will 
be thrown by one of you (you will take turns throwing the die) to determine whether the sequence will 
continue or not.  The experimenter will announce loudly the result of each die roll. If a number from 0 to 7 
appears, the sequence will continue into next round. If an 8 or 9 appears, the sequence ends. Therefore, 
after each round there is 80% chance that you will play another round and 20% chance that the sequence 
will end. 
Suppose that a number less than 8 has appeared. Then you will play the same game as in the previous 
round, but with an individual selected at random whose role is different from  yours. You record the 
outcome and your earnings for the round. Then another throw is made with the same die to decide whether 
First Mover 
B 
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the sequence continues for another round. 
If an 8 or 9 appears, the sequence ends. The experimenter will announce whether or not a new 
sequence will be played. If a new sequence is to be played then you will be randomly reassigned as a First 
Mover or a Second Mover. The new sequence will then be played as described above. 
If the experiment does not end within 2 hours, you will be invited to continue the experiment in the 
next several days. 
Earnings 
Each point you earn is worth 0.5 cent ($0.005). Therefore, the more points you earn the more money 
you earn. You will be paid your earnings from all the rounds of all sequences in cash, and in private, at the 
end of today's experiment as well as $5 show-up fee. 
Final Comments 
First, do not discuss your decisions or your results with anyone at any time during the experiment. 
Second, your ID# is private. Do not reveal it to anyone. 
Third, since there is 80% chance that at the end of a round the sequence will continue, you can expect, 
on average, to play 5 rounds in a given sequence. However, since the stopping decision is made randomly, 
some sequences may be much longer than 5 rounds and others may be much shorter. 
Fourth, your role as a First Mover  or a Second Mover will be randomly assigned when a new 
sequence begins. Your role will not change for the duration of that sequence. 
Finally, remember that after each round of a sequence you will be matched randomly with a player 
whose  role  is  different  from  yours.  Therefore,  the  probability  of  you  being  matched  with  the  same 
individual in two consecutive rounds of a game is 1/3 since there are 3 First Movers and 3 Second Movers 
in the room. 
Questions? 
Now is the time for questions. Does anyone have any questions? 
Quiz 
If there are no more questions, please finish the quiz. Your answers to this quiz will not affect your 
earnings. The purpose of the quiz is to help you understand the instruction better.  After everyone has 
completed the quiz the answers will be reviewed. 
 
 
Continuation Instruction (Min_No sessions) 
 
From now on until the end of today’s experiment, everything is the same as in the original instruction 
except that there is no information available anymore to the First Mover about the decision that his/her 
paired Second Mover has made in the last round.   47 
Continuation Instruction (Info_No_Cost sessions) 
 
From now on everything is the same as in the original instructions except that there is no information 
available anymore to the First Mover about the past choices that his/her paired Second Mover has made 
in the most recent rounds of the current sequence, or about the frequency with which his/her paired 
Second Mover has chosen C or D in all rounds of the current sequence. 
 
 
Continuation Instruction (Info_No_Cost sessions) 
 
From now on until the end of today’s session, at the beginning of each round of a sequence except the 
first round, the First Mover may choose to buy information about the past choices that his/her paired 
Second Mover has made in the current sequence, at a price of 2 points. The information provided is the 
same that was provided in the instructions for the first part of today’s session: the First Mover is informed 
of the past choices that his/her paired Second Mover has made in the most recent rounds of the current 
sequence and about the frequency with which his/her paired Second Mover has chosen C or D in all 
rounds of the current sequence. The First Mover is free to decide whether or not to buy this information 
every round. If the First Mover chooses to buy the information, the 2 point cost will be deducted from 
his/her payoff from the round; otherwise there will be no deduction (and no information on the Second 
Mover will be provided to the First Mover). As in all previous rounds, the Second Mover will only be 
informed of his own payoff, and will not be able to observe whether or not the First Mover has chosen to 
purchase information about the Second Mover. 
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Appendix  C:  Aggregate  Frequencies  in  No_Info_Cost  and  Info_No_Cost  Sessions  (first  period 
excluded) 
 





treatment  No. of Obs. 
Frequency of  
Invest 
No_Info_Cost  0.594  0.846  0.867  3 
Info_No_Cost  0.810  0.379  0.545  3 
Frequency of  
Return-given-Invest 
No_Info_Cost  0.722  0.928  0.887  3 
Info_No_Cost  0.925  0.541  0.783  3 
Frequency of  
Invest-and-Return 
No_Info_Cost  0.424  0.786  0.776  3 
Info_No_Cost  0.751  0.228  0.463  3 
Table C1: Average Frequencies for No_Info_Cost and Info_No_Cost Sessions  
(First Period Excluded) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 